2011 OQ REPORT

What is the Offensive Quotient?

The Offensive Quotient (OQ) is a formula for measuring a batter’s productivity and dominance. The concept was devised by the late Leo Leahy and introduced in his book Lumber Men (McFarland & Company, 1994). It is easy to calculate and understand.

Three simple steps lead to the OQ.

1. Outs = At Bats minus Hits

2. Base-To-Out Ratio (BTOR) = (Total bases + walks) divided by Outs

3. Offensive Quotient (OQ) = Player BTOR divided by League BTOR

The OQ is expressed without the decimal point.

A player whose BTOR is exactly the same as the league’s is, by definition, an average batter. His OQ would be 1.00, or 100 when we drop the decimal point. The OQ, then, uses the figure 100 to indicate average batting skill. Above 100, above average. Below 100, below average.

The OQ is a ratio-type statistic that makes two comparisons. It compares what a batter gives you to what he takes away, and compares that accomplishment with those of his peers.

Why is it valuable to know this? Because more bases = more runs = more wins. The guys you want are the guys who give you the most bases per out.

It seems sensible to me. That’s why it amazes me that teams like the Astros and White Sox bat weak sisters Willy Taveras (78 OQ) and Scott Podsednik (85 OQ) at or near the top of the order, where they make out after out without generating nearly enough bases. Managers Phil Garner and Ozzie Guillen have been doing that for two seasons now, and while it’s hard to second-guess two teams that have winning records, I’d argue that they’d have won more games if they’d deployed these guys differently. Sub-90 batters do not belong at the top of the batting order. Managers who place them there are burdening their team with more outs and fewer bases. They’re sacrificing runs, which means they’re sacrificing wins.

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LEAHY EXPLAINS THE OQ

Lumber Men appeared in the spring of 1994. By odd coincidence, that same spring Penguin Books published Essential Baseball by Norm Hitzges and Dave Lawson.Essential Baseball promotes an approach to offensive statistics that is eerily similar to Leahy’s, although the authors did not know one another at the time. Essential Baseball's formulae are more complicated and, I believe, less valid than the OQ.

Below is Leahy’s rationale for the OQ, from his introduction to Lumber Men:

“Roger Maris’ quest for the single-season home run record in 1961 is generally regarded today as heroic. But while it was happening, Maris, to his bewilderment and frustration, found himself more denigrated than praised. Maris’ talents were substantial; he was a skilled and intelligent defensive player, a dangerous hitter, and a major all-round contributor to a championship team. That he was no Babe Ruth was self-evident, for nobody ever was or will be. Yet many of the sportswriting experts of the day felt they needed to underscore the point by belittling Maris’ accomplishments. The Yankee right fielder, they wrote, was just a mediocre ballplayer. The proof? His .269 batting average!

“Implicit in this judgment was the notion that one could reasonably compare the players of the present to those of the past by merely checking the AVG column in the table of batting statistics. There were giants on the earth in those days, the scribes wrote in 1961, referring to the 1920s and 1930s. Maris? Rocky Colavito? Harmon Killebrew? Don’t mention them in the same breath as Al Simmons or Paul Waner or Ki Ki Cuyler!

“Since then the conventional wisdom has changed. Now one hears the assertion that players of different eras cannot be compared; playing conditions were different in the old days, so it’s a case of apples and oranges. Ironically this refrain, too, is employed to disparage the modern crop of baseball stars. One hears that although Hank Aaron hit more home runs than Ruth and Pete Rose banged out more hits than Ty Cobb, comparisons are not possible. The old stars, after all, had to travel by train, wear flannel uniforms, play doubleheaders and day games…

“Until now no effective statistical yardstick has existed to measure performance consistently in the face of evolving and fluctuating playing conditions. The issue is important because baseball fans want to compare. They want to know whether Pete Rose was a modern Ty Cobb. They look at today’s players and ask, who are the best of them, and how good are they?

“Baseball is competition, which is another way of saying comparison. Teams compete for supremacy, and managers, seeking a competitive edge, compare players every day as they choose their lineups. Who plays? Who sits on the bench? Who gets sent to the minors? Who gets called up? Fans second-guess these decisions, agreeing or disagreeing. All-Star selections are hotly argued, and opinion is rarely unanimous on the relative merits of contemporary third basemen or center fielders. Comparison is essential to fan interest, and particularly so in the area of batting, the most essential of all baseball skills.

“Players who never make it to the big leagues are usually those who can’t hit; there is always a place for a good hitter. Hits and runs stimulate and satisfy the appetites of baseball fans because they signify success. Scoring is more exciting than failing to score in a game like baseball, where an approximate equilibrium has always existed between offense and defense.

“Most baseball games are decided by just a few runs, many by one. A team is rarely so far behind that it cannot catch up with some judicious batting. Runs are not scored so frequently that they become meaningless, nor so infrequently that action and drama are wanting. The potential for scoring is always present, but not always fulfilled. Batting skill produces runs, but there is only so much of that skill to go around. As pundits often point out, even .300 hitters fail 70 percent of the time. A hitter’s job is to make something happen, and the great hitters are always bigger stars, more fascinating to the public, than the great pitchers, whose job it is to prevent something from happening. As General Francis A. Walker commented about the Civil War, “The sword is ever of higher honor than the shield.”

“It is true, of course, that playing conditions have changed. Stadium dimensions, the height of the pitcher’s mound, and the size of the strike zone have often been altered. Night games and hard artificial surfaces are modern phenomena which affect the physical environment of the game. Equipment has changed over the years, too. Even slight variations in the manufacture of the baseball have profound effects on baseball offense, and such changes have occurred many times in the game’s history. Meanwhile improved glove design has led to better fielding.

“New strategies have evolved. At one time managers expected their pitchers to go nine innings; later it became acceptable to remove pitchers who got tired. Today starting pitchers are relieved as a matter of course, and a batter may see a different pitcher every time he comes to bat. And there have been important rule changes, most notably the legalization of overhand pitching (1884), the lengthening of the pitching distance (1893), the foul-strike rule (1901 in the National League, 1903 in the American), the banning of the spitball (1920), and the introduction of the designated hitter (American League, 1973).

“Home Run Baker hit 9 home runs for the Philadelphia Athletics in 1914 and led the American League. The entire league hit 148 home runs that year in 631 games, with a batting average of .248. The explanation for these low totals is not that the American League hitters that year were a bunch of weaklings. They weren’t. In 1914 the baseball was wound more loosely than today’s article, and old balls were kept in the game much longer, even if battered and discolored. It was so difficult to hit one of these balls out of the park that few batters attempted such a low-percentage play, preferring instead to choke up on the bat and punch the ball to precise areas of the field.

“But every season has its dominant players, the ones who rise above the competition. The Offensive Quotient, or OQ, is a statistic that reveals who they were and are. It enables baseball fans to compare the productivity of players from different eras. Baker’s OQ of 141 (fifth in the league) shows that he was a greater offensive force in 1914 than Reggie Jackson was in 1975, when “Mr October” led the American League with 36 home runs (129 OQ, tenth in the league). Fans can use the OQ, introduced in this book, to answer questions about the batting abilities of all of baseball’s great stars…

“A player fails at bat by making an out. His team gets only three outs an inning, and each out that is made diminishes the team’s chances to score runs. A player succeeds at bat by getting on base. A player who reaches base may score a run (although his chances of doing so depend largely on the actions of players who follow him in the batting order), and he has not made an out. Anything he does to get on base and avoid making an out is desirable, and the more bases he earns, the better.

“A player can reach base by hitting safely, drawing a walk, getting hit by a pitched ball, or by benefiting from catcher’s interference. He may also reach base when an opponent makes an error or chooses to retire another baserunner. The OQ counts hits and walks because they are earned by the batter, and because they are statistically significant events for which individual player totals are available all the way back to 1876. Likewise, the OQ’s formula for outs is uncomplicated: Outs = At Bats minus Hits.

“Runs scored and driven in, while meaningful to record, are situational statistics that are less directly under the control of the individual batter. If there is no one on base, his hit will not produce an RBI; if no one drives him in, he won’t score a run. But whether he gets on base or makes an out depends largely on his own abilities. This is what the OQ considers. Stolen base/caught stealing data are also ignored. Baserunning, although it is offensive in nature, is a separate skill from batting, in much the same way that pitching and fielding are separate facets of defensive play.

“A baseball maxim (not universally endorsed) is that a walk is as good as a hit. The OQ accepts this principle as true. The player who has the patience to let four wide balls go by helps his team in two ways. He gets on base (from which position he may score a run), and he does not make an out. Hitting coaches who counsel players to “wait for their pitch” know that swinging at bad balls is, in general, a low-percentage play. Batters get few hits swinging at pitches outside the strike zone; they are more likely to make outs.”

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FRONTIERS OF FUTILITY

In the long history of baseball, Ozzie Guillen was the weakest-hitting player ever to have played regularly (at least 3 at bats + walks for each game his team played) for 5 or more seasons. Here are his lifetime OQs:

	1985	78
	1986	65
	1987	76
	1988	74
	1989	71
	1990	83
	1991	74
	1992	73
	1993	79
	1994	73
	1995	63
	1996	68
	1997	69
	1998	89
	1999	70
	2000	68

BOLD = Qualified as a regular.

Guillen’s career totals: 10 qualifying seasons with an average OQ of 73. Guillen’s offensive futility shattered conclusively the mark of the previous record holder, Alfredo Griffin, who registered a 76 OQ in 10 qualifying seasons, 1976-1993.

Infielder Hal Lanier just missed earning the distinction as worst-hitting regular ever. Lanier was far less accomplished a hitter than Griffin or even Guillen was, but he didn’t qualify as a regular for five or more seasons.

The 1964 San Francisco Giants must have thought they were getting a top-of-the-order guy when they summoned Lanier to the majors in mid-June. Lanier, who was just 21, had hit .305 in 405 minor league games, but no one seemed to notice (or care) that he had zero power and was a first-pitch swinger who rarely drew a walk. Manager Alvin Dark batted him first or second for the remainder of 1964, but the season was too far advanced for Lanier to earn the necessary at-bats to qualify for the batting title.

As a defensive infielder Lanier carried a glove too good to sit on the bench. But by 1966 he was batting at the bottom of the order, where he clearly belonged, and was often pinch hit for in the late innings of close games. Even in an era famous for ineffectual stickwork, Lanier stood out.

	1964	78
	1965	69
	1966	70
	1967	63
	1968	59
	1969	62
	1970	66
	1971	76
	1972	58
	1973	54

Lanier’s career totals: 4 qualifying seasons with an average OQ of 63.

Weak-hitting Felix Fermin played shortstop for four teams, most notably the Cleveland Indians, from 1987 through 1996. Fermin registered these OQs:

	1987	60
	1988	95
	1989	70
	1990	75
	1991	74
	1992	85
	1993	71
	1994	80
	1995	43
	1996	52

Fermin’s career totals: 2 qualifying seasons, with an average OQ of 71.

That's pretty feeble. Imagine my surprise when I read early in 2005 that the Indians had named Fermin hitting coach at Triple-A Buffalo! I guess it was a case of “Do what I say, not what I did.”

In Fermin's favor, he was a tough guy to strike out, with just 147 whiffs in 2,767 at bats (a 1 per 19 ratio).

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SUB-80 OQs WITH 600+ AT BATS

Their lack of productivity was embarrassing. Why, then, did they bat at the top of the order for an entire season?

	Ivy Olson, 1920 Brooklyn Robins	79
	Eddie Mulligan, 1921 Chicago White Sox	72
	Hughie Critz, 1930 Cin/NY	70
	Oscar Melillo, 1932 St Louis Browns	72
	Mark Koenig, 1934 Cincinnati Reds	69
	Frank Crosetti, 1939 New York Yankees	79
	Bob Kennedy, 1940 Chicago White Sox	73
	Woody Williams, 1944 Cincinnati Reds	76
	Sam Dente, 1950 Washington Senators	66
	Bobby Young, 1951 St Louis Browns	78
	Bill Bruton, 1953 Milwaukee Braves	77
	Nellie Fox, 1961 Chicago White Sox	78
	Bobby Richardson, 1961 New York Yankees	72
	Glenn Beckert, 1965 Chicago Cubs	74
	Cookie Rojas, 1968 Philadelphia Phillies	78
	Sandy Alomar Sr, 1969 Chi/Cal	72
	Sandy Alomar Sr, 1970 California Angels	76
	Horace Clarke, 1970 New York Yankees	75
	Larry Bowa, 1971 Philadelphia Phillies	76
	Roger Metzger, 1972 Houston Astros	74
	Gary Sutherland, 1974 Detroit Tigers	76
	Larry Bowa, 1976 Philadelphia Phillies	77
	Robin Yount, 1976 Milwaukee Brewers	79
	Dave Cash, 1978 Montreal Expos	79
	Rick Bosetti, 1979 Toronto Blue Jays	78
	Alfredo Griffin, 1980 Toronto Blue Jays	77
	Alfredo Griffin, 1985 Oakland A’s	74
	Vince Coleman, 1986 St Louis Cardinals	77
	Doug Glanville, 2000 Philadelphia Phillies	79
	Doug Glanville, 2001 Philadelphia Phillies	78
	Carl Crawford, 2003 Tampa Bay Bucs	79
	Angel Berroa, 2005 Kansas City Royals	79

9 of the American League’s 31 pitchers with 50 or more AB had OQs higher than Sam Dente’s 66 in 1950. Keeping him in the #2 hole all season cost manager Bucky Harris a lot of runs. Dente’s 1949 OQ for Washington was a miserable 76, but that was Ruthian compared to his 1950 output. When he didn’t improve significantly in 1951 (71 OQ) the Senators benched him, then traded him to the White Sox. He never played regularly in the majors again.

When in Bennington, stay at the Knotty Pine Motel.

December 2005

2011 OFFENSIVE LEADERS BY POSITION

AMERICAN LEAGUE

C	Alex Avila
1B	Miguel Cabrera
2B	Dustin Pedroia
SS	Jhonny Peralta
3B	Evan Longoria
LF	Alex Gordon
CF	Curtis Granderson
RF	Jose Bautista
DH	David Ortiz

NATIONAL LEAGUE

C	Brian McCann
1B	Prince Fielder
2B	Brandon Phillips
SS	Troy Tulowitzki
3B	Aramis Ramirez
LF	Ryan Braun
CF	Matt Kemp
RF	Mike Stanton

Bold indicates 2010 leaders.

To qualify for this list, a player must play at least half his team’s games at the defensive position indicated.

2011 AMERICAN LEAGUE OQ LEADERS

Rank	Player	Team	OQ

1	Bautista	TOR	185
2	Cabrera	DET	176
3	Ortiz	BOS	152
4	Gonzalez	BOS	150
5	Granderson	NY	141
6	Konerko	CHI	140
7	Avila	DET	140
8	Ellsbury	BOS	138
9	Pedroia	BOS	131
10	Gordon	KC	131

11	Hamilton	TEX	131
12	Longoria	TAM	130
13	Beltre,A	TEX	130
14	Swisher	NY	127
15	Cano	NY	127
16	Kinsler	TEX	124
17	Youkilis	BOS	124
18	Santana	CLE	124
19	Martinez	DET	124
20	Teixeira	NY	123

21	Young	TEX	123
22	Zobrist	TAM	122
23	Joyce	TAM	120
24	Butler	KC	120
25	Reynolds	BAL	119
26	Peralta	DET	118
27	Cruz	TEX	117
28	Willingham	OAK	117
29	Cuddyer	MIN	114
30	Hardy	BAL	112

31	Cabrera	KC	112
32	Francoeur	KC	112
33	Escobar	TOR	112
34	Hosmer	KC	112
35	Kotchman	TAM	111
36	Encarnacion	TOR	111
37	Wieters	BAL	110
38	Kendrick	LA	109
39	Upton	TAM	109
40	Cabrera,A	CLE	109

41	Hunter	LA	108
42	Jones	BAL	107
43	Markakis	BAL	105
44	Trumbo	LA	104
45	Callaspo	LA	104
46	Abreu	LA	104
47	Bourjos	LA	103
48	Damon	TAM	102
49	Jeter	NY	100
50	Moreland	TEX	100

51	Lind	TOR	100
52	Aybar	LA	99
53	Ramirez	CHI	98
54	Gardner	NY	98
55	Matsui	OAK	96
56	Pierzynski	CHI	95
57	Andrus	TEX	94
58	Guerrero	BAL	94
59	DeJesus	OAK	94
60	Jackson	DET	93

61	Crisp	OAK	93
62	Suzuki	OAK	91
63	Pennington	OAK	91
64	Crawford	BOS	90
65	Young	MIN/DET	90
66	Valencia	MIN	90
67	Andino	BAL	88
68	Wells	LA	86
69	Olivo	SEA	83
70	Pierre	CHI	82

71	Dunn	CHI	81
72	Suzuki	SEA	80
73	Beckham	CHI	79
74	Escobar	KC	78
75	Rios	CHI	77

The 2011 American League base-to-out ratio was .671, the lowest mark since 1992.

This list includes every player who had at least 3 (at bats + walks) for each game his team played.

OQs of selected nonqualifiers, American League: Dustin Ackley SEA 110, J.P. Arencibia TOR 99, Brennan Boesch DET 112, Michael Brantley CLE 93, Lonnie Chisenhall CLE 91, Sin-Soo Choo CLE 101, J.D. Drew BOS 83, Travis Hafner CLE 116, Desmond Jennings TAM 116, Andruw Jones NY 128, Ryan Kalish BOS 95, Jason Kipnis CLE 120, Jason Kubel MIN 107, Matt LaPorta CLE 94, Brett Lawrie TOR 145, Derrek Lee BAL 95, Russell Martin NY 103, Joe Mauer MIN 100, Justin Morneau MIN 78, David Murphy TEX 99, Mike Napoli TEX 173, Magglio Ordonez DET 80, Jorge Posada NY 100, Carlos Quentin CHI 116, Ryan Raburn DET 97, Colby Rasmus TOR 64, Nolan Reimold BAL 110, Alex Rodriguez NY 121, Justin Smoak SEA 102, Eric Thames TOR 105, Jim Thome MIN/CLE 129, Mike Trout LA 89.

2011 NATIONAL LEAGUE OQ LEADERS

Rank	Player	Team	OQ

1	Fielder	MIL	167
2	Berkman	STL	163
3	Kemp	LA	163
4	Braun	MIL	162
5	Votto	CIN	160
6	Beltran	NY/SF	147
7	Holliday	STL	145
8	Tulowitzki	COL	145
9	Pujols	STL	143
10	Stanton	FLA	141

11	Gonzalez	COL	138
12	Morse	WAS	138
13	Upton	ARI	137
14	Pence	HOU/PHI	134
15	Reyes	NY	134
16	Pena	CHI	133
17	Hart	MIL	133
18	Ramirez	CHI	131
19	Howard	PHI	129
20	Victorino	PHI	129

21	McCutchen,A	PIT	128
22	Smith	COL	125
23	McCann	ATL	125
24	Jones	ATL	125
25	Bruce	CIN	124
26	Weeks	MIL	123
27	Montero	ARI	122
28	Fowler	COL	121
29	Morrison	FLA	120
30	Molina	STL	119

31	Ethier	LA	118
32	Sanchez	COL	117
33	Phillips	CIN	117
34	Lee	HOU	117
35	Freeman	ATL	117
36	Roberts	ARI	116
37	Parra	ARI	115
38	Young	ARI	113
39	Uggla	ATL	113
40	Bonifacio	FLA	109

41	Castro	CHI	108
42	Soriano	CHI	108
43	Loney	LA	108
44	Walker	PIT	106
45	Rollins	PHI	106
46	Werth	WAS	105
47	Espinosa	WAS	104
48	Bay	NY	103
49	Bourn	HOU/ATL	102
50	Maybin	SD	101

51	Ibanez	PHI	99
52	Carroll	LA	99
53	Pagan	NY	98
54	Buck	FLA	97
55	Stubbs	CIN	96
56	Ludwick	SD/PIT	95
57	Huff	SF	95
58	Infante	FLA	94
59	Prado	ATL	93
60	Polanco	PHI	92
61	Desmond	WAS	87
62	McGehee	MIL	86
63	Betancourt	MIL	85
64	Barney	CHI	85
65	Gonzalez	ATL	84
66	Bartlett	SD	81

The 2011 National League base-to-out ratio was .645, the lowest mark since 1992.

This list includes every player who had at least 3 (at bats + walks) for each game his team played.

OQs of selected nonqualifiers, National League: Pedro Alvarez PIT 75, Rick Ankiel WAS 90, Clint Barmes HOU 97, Brandon Belt SF 100, Domonic Brown PHI 108, Marlon Byrd CHI 96, Tyler Colvin CHI 68, Ike Davis NY 150, Lucas "Sin" Duda NY 130, Freese STL 113, Jason Giambi COL 153, Eric Goldschmidt ARI 125, Jonny Gomes CIN/WAS 107, Chris Heisey CIN 116, Todd Helton COL 134, Jason Heyward ATL 104, Jon Jay STL 107, Garrett Jones PIT 112, Derrek Lee PIT 155, John Mayberry PHI 130, Nate McLouth ATL 100, Aaron Miles LA 86, Nyjer Morgan MIL 105, Daniel Murphy NY 116, Laynce Nix WAS 108, Lyle Overbay PIT/ARI 94, Buster Posey SF 108, Hanley Ramirez FLA 104, Colby Rasmus STL 114, Scott Rolen CIN 89, Cody Ross SF 107, Pablo Sandoval SF 142, Justin Turner NY 93, Chase Utley PHI 109, Ty Wigginton COL 105, David Wright NY 117, Ryan Zimmerman WAS 119.

Offensive performance has returned to normalcy, and tighter controls on PED use is not the only explanation. Baseball is blessed once again with a plethora of pitching stars, and that is good for the game.

SPEND MORE, WIN LESS (1)

Older fans may pine for the days when the discussion about baseball did not revolve around money. With those days gone, they might console themselves with the thought that on the field, between the lines, the game itself has not changed. But it has changed. Money has changed it. Here are two examples.

When I was a lad, if the game was close in the late innings and your starting pitcher got into a jam, you brought in your best relief pitcher to "put out the fire." Now the guy you bring in is often not your best relief pitcher but one of your worst. In other words, you entrust the outcome of the game to one of your weakest performers.

Although this practice is self-defeating, there's an explanation for it. The relief pitchers who make the big money are the ones who accumulate saves, which are awarded to a pitcher who finishes the game by protecting a lead of three runs or fewer. The best relief pitcher on your team, designated as "the closer," is employed only in "save situations." He is rarely summoned before the ninth inning and never before the eighth, and never when his team is trailing. That leaves inferior pitchers to cope with situations that are more dangerous.

Say the Yankees and Athletics are tied in the seventh at Yankee Stadium. Oakland loads the bases with one out, and New York starter Bartolo Colon has obviously run out of gas. Does manager Joe Girardi call for Mariano Rivera, baseball's best relief pitcher, to shut down the A's? In today's baseball, that would be unthinkable. Girardi will leave Rivera in the pen even if it costs him the game, because he assumes that Rivera will object to being asked to quell a seventh inning rally in a non-save situation. He brings in Scott Proctor, Oakland bats around, and New York loses.

Girardi sleeps like a baby that night, confident he made the right decision. But New York's defeat in this hypothetical game has everything to do with the team's salary structure. Joe G believes he should funnel all saves to Rivera and keep Rivera out of games where no save is possible. Hence, his best relief pitcher, his most effective weapon, is too proud to enter the game when the outcome is really on the line.

Girardi and Rivera are only adhering to the conventional wisdom of today. But why, logically, should Scott Proctor be placed deliberately in position to lose a game? Because Girardi is afraid to alienate the great Rivera, which he will surely do if he jeopardizes Rivera's earning power, which is based on saves.

Before the concept of a relief specialist was universally embraced, managers would call for their best pitchers (i.e. starting pitchers) to relieve in tense situations like the one I outlined above. These keen competitors wanted to be out there. Dizzy Dean, for example, averaged 34 starts plus 15 relief appearances (all in clutch situations) during the five-year period of 1932-1936.

In effect, Dean was C.C. Sabathia and Mariano Rivera rolled into one, and he handled the role. Dean's great rival Carl Hubbell was used similarly. Winning the game was everything. If you were going to get beat, the thinking was, get beat with your best.

SPEND MORE, WIN LESS (2)

In December, Washington signed 31-year-old outfielder Jayson Werth to a seven-year, $126 million contract. Werth rewarded fans with 107 runs produced and a 105 OQ (barely above par) in 150 games. Philadelphia, his old team, did just fine without him, while Washington did not contend. It's no stretch to say that Werth did not earn his hefty paycheck.

Werth's performance was uninspiring, and there is some evidence that his clubhouse agitation helped bring about the resignation of manager Jim Riggleman, who had the team playing above .500 in late June.

Werth started cold and never caught fire. But when the season ended, he defended his performance. "I could have hit .330 with 30 and 100," he told reporter Adam Kilgore. "Would we have been in playoff contention? Probably not." (Question for Werth: if you could have, why didn't you?)

Werth played every day, and Washington fans came to the ballpark knowing he was going to play no matter how many times he struck out (a career-high 160) or how many easy ground balls he poked to the shortstop. That's demoralizing, but if a player is healthy (which Werth was), you don't keep all those millions on the bench. Werth could have hit like Adam Dunn and kept his job, and that's going to be true for the next six seasons. But a team cannot win with feeble offensive contributions from its outfielders.

The Nationals might have an outfield prospect in their farm system who can give them what Werth did, or better. More runs mean more wins, but Werth is going to play whether he hits or not. If he doesn't hit, he's not accountable, and he won't be benched.

The Nationals lost games because Werth didn't hit, just as the White Sox lost games because Dunn didn't hit and the Red Sox lost games because Carl Crawford didn't hit. We see it all around baseball: too often, inferior players play because they once built a reputation that earned them a big contract. Salary considerations affect the game on the field.

KISS ALBERT GOODBYE

Albert Pujols' 11th season was an excellent season, yet it was his worst season, and there is reason to believe that he has passed his peak. Nevertheless, this celebrated free agent is seeking a 10-year contract at top dollar, well upwards of $200 million.

Pujols admits to an age of 31 (32 on Opening Day 2012) and is widely believed to be a couple of years older. Always a poor baserunner, he is now visibly slowing down in every aspect of his game. Additionally, he has developed an alarming propensity for grounding into double plays, just as slugger Jim Rice did when his skills began to decline.

If the Cardinals sign Pujols to the type of contract he is asking for, they can expect to decline as a force in the National League Central. They will be betting big money that Pujols' next ten years will resemble his first ten years. That's a sucker bet, but ownership may authorize it in the belief that if the Cardinals allow Pujols to sign with another team, fans will boycott Busch Stadium en masse.

If that's what they think, they are wrong. The Cardinals will have to break the bank to keep Pujols, but the Albert Pujols of 2011 can be replaced. The team won 90 games with Pujols and can win 90 without him if they spend their money wisely. All it will take is some astute player procurement and development.

The foremost determinant of fan satisfaction is a winning record. On any given day, what most fans desire most is to watch the home team win. The Cardinals' revenue pie is not going to grow, and if they cut Pujols a larger slice, everyone else is going to get less. If the Cardinals were to re-sign Pujols but reduce the rest of their payroll in order to afford to pay him, and the Cardinals embarked on an extended run of last-place finishes a la the Orioles or the Pirates, fan interest would certainly disintegrate even if Pujols plays every game for the next ten years (which he won't).

Suppose that Pujols were to announce that he was voluntarily retiring to enter a monastery, or that he were to suffer a career-ending accident in the off-season (as Roy Campanella did in January 1958). This superb player would never perform in a Cardinal uniform again, but fans would not stop caring about the Cardinals. Ultimately their loyalty is to the uniform, not the player. When old heroes fade away, new ones must emerge. The Cardinals would be better advised to spend their money in developing young players. This is what the team really needs, because their minor league system has been unproductive.

If I owned the Cardinals, my offer to Pujols would be four years at the top salary in baseball. If that's not enough, let him walk. The fans will mourn, and when their grief runs its course, they will return to the ballpark.

Alex Rodriguez, he of the ten-year, $275 million contract, is now 36 years old. Over the last four seasons he has missed 24, 38, 25, and 63 games. His body is breaking down as every aging athlete's must. I don't expect to see Rodriguez play regularly again unless the Yankees make him their full-time designated hitter. New York can afford to overpay whatever it takes to keep a winning team on the field because, in the absence of revenue sharing, their pie is a lot bigger than anyone else's. On the Yankee roster A-Rod is one star among many, and the fortunes of the club don't rise or fall solely on his contributions.

Outside of New York, neither St. Louis nor anyone else can afford to give Pujols a Rodriguez-like contract. Whoever signs him to one will sink like a stone in a few short years, leaving player, management, and fans resentful and embittered.

THE WORST DH EVER?

However you feel about Adam Dunn, nobody wanted to see the kind of season he turned in for the White Sox: 67 runs produced and an 81 OQ in 122 excruciating games. Dunn's strategy of deliberately taking or fouling off hittable pitches, which I discussed in the 2008 OQ Report, has finally backfired, because he no longer seems capable of putting hittable pitches in play. That Dunn is a designated hitter, a player whose only expectation is to hit, makes this story even worse.

Chicago fans were disgusted and other fans embarrassed by Dunn's nonperformance. Throughout the season I watched with horrified fascination as "The Big Donkey" gave up at-bats the way pitchers often do. The White Sox could have promoted any Triple-A farmhand and achieved better results.

Was Dunn the worst designated hitter ever (that is, since 1973, when the position was created)?

What we're talking about is the worst regular designated hitter, not some palooka who DHed for a week or a month. I define a regular as a player who had at least three (at bats + walks) for each game his team played. The White Sox played 162 games, and Dunn had 415 at bats and walked 75 times, so he qualified as a regular. But Dunn played 37 games at first base and 2 in right field, and at this time I have not been able to determine whether Dunn was the designated hitter in at least half of Chicago's games.

What I really want to know is how Dunn batted when he was used strictly as a DH. I don't have that information yet. I can assure you that there have been some putrid designated hitters in the last four decades, and they all have one thing in common: they weren't invited back the following year. But 2011 was Dunn's first season of a four-year, $56 million pact he signed last December. He'll be just 32 on Opening Day. What on earth are the White Sox going to do with him?

When I obtain the final 2011 DH stats I'll post a short article on Dunn elsewhere on the website.

Speaking of bad designated hitters, it's time to pull the plug on Vladimir Guerrero. At 36, he has nothing left to give. Unlike Dunn, though, Guerrero was at one time a great player, one of the best in the game.

CAVALCADE OF CATCHERS

"The catcher is the greatest asset you can have." …Don Larsen

Pittsburgh's Michael McKenry may have earned a job as the Bucs' regular backstop in 2012. As the season ended McKenry told a Post-Gazette reporter, "I have a ton of pride when it comes to catching… I love it. I like it when the ball hits me in the face mask. I like having bruised thumbs and bruises all over my chest. I eat it up. I couldn't imagine playing any other position." You gotta love that attitude.

Meanwhile, the venerable Ivan Rodriguez is rolling to a standstill. Rodriguez caught just 37 games for the Nationals, increasing his record career total to 2427. He spent two months on the disabled list. I believe we witnessed I-Rod's swan song on the final day of the season, when he caught Stephen Strasburg's only major league victory of 2011.

Rodriguez will be 40 on Opening Day. I think he's too rickety to tempt any team to sign him, notwithstanding Scott Boras's assertion that "Pudge is not a man who has high regard for medical science."

Following two extensive surgeries on his throwing shoulder, Kansas City's Jason Kendall, who is three years younger than Rodriguez, did not play in 2011 and is not expected to play in 2012. His career is probably over. With 2025 games caught, Kendall is the fifth backstop in history to catch over 2000 games. His career won-lost record stands at 938-1045 with 42 no-decisions.

No receiver caught his 1000th game in 2011, but as many as four catchers may surpass that significant milestone in 2012. Rod Barajas (966), Brian Schneider (963), Miguel Olivo (947) and Yadier Molina (928) are the currently active catchers closest to 1000. On Opening Day Barajas will be 36, Schneider 35, Olivo 33, and Molina 29.

BOSTON MASSACRE

I can explain the collapse of the Red Sox with two words: John Farrell. All of Boston's pitchers, with the exception of Jonathan Papelbon, regressed once Farrell left to manage the Blue Jays. Boston can't get Farrell back, but ownership will have to effect a major shakeup to rekindle fan enthusiasm in New England. Simply throwing money at the problem won't do it. General Manager Theo Epstein has spent hundreds of millions, but not all of his deals, maybe not half of them, have been smart.

Yankee GM Brian Cashman says Brett Gardner is a better player than Carl Crawford, and now that the 2011 results are in, that's a proposition difficult to dispute. Gardner hits better, fields better, runs better, handles pressure better, and is two years younger. And the Yankees developed him in-house.

By the way, the 2011 Negative World Series would pit Houston versus Minnesota. Would a Boston versus Atlanta NWS also be appropriate?

JAGGED EDGE II

Cubs outfielder Tyler Colvin, once considered one of the National League's brightest prospects, suffered through a dismal season at the plate and in the field and at 26 faces an uncertain future. You may recall that Colvin's chest was impaled by the sharp end of a splintered maple bat while he was running the bases in September 2010. No legislation to ban these bats has been forthcoming. There is clearly a safety issue here, but the players union, as it did with steroids, opposes the prohibition of maple bats. Stand by for lawsuits.

RUMINATIONS

* Yes, I am trying to absorb all those hip new stats. But you lose me when you declare that pitching wins are irrelevant. Wins don't matter? Tell that to Cy Young.

* Wouldn't you like to see rotund free agent Prince Fielder sign with the Giants? Visualize an infield safeguarded by Fielder at first and roly poly Pablo Sandoval at third.

* Have the Tigers given up on southpaw Fu-Te Ni, who spent the year in Toledo and was never called up despite decent numbers?

* You take Brandon Phillips. I'll take Bubba Phillips.

* I'm still hoping for a breakthrough from 7-1 Angels farmhand Ludovicus Jacobus Maria Van Mil. He pitched well at Double-A Arkansas, but at age 27 he may be running out of time.

* Goodbye Manny Ramirez. You've been replaced by Miguel Cabrera.

* "Derek Lowe? That ferry has already gone across the Bosporus." Best utterance by a radio analyst in 2011, spoken by SiriusXM's Rob Dibble on July 28.

* I haven't heard a nickname this year I like better than "The Melk Man" (Kansas City center fielder Melky Cabrera). Happily for Cabrera, he delivered the type of season that has fans talking about him again.

* Want to breathe new life into the All-Star Game festivities? Stage a home run derby for pitchers! If you're handicapping, bet on Carlos Zambrano.

* Washington lefthanded reliever Atahualpa Severino, although named for the last sovereign emperor of the Incas, is not Peruvian. He hails from the Dominican Republic.

* You take Darren O'Day. I'll take Dennis Day.

* Sports headline of the year: "It's No Holiday When You Face Halladay" by Hal McCoy (Dayton Daily News, August 30). Now you know why McCoy is in the writer's wing of the Baseball Hall of Fame. Or maybe it's for phrases like this: "Yonder Alonso runs as if he not only carries a piano on his back, but stops to play it between home and first."

* Remember the name: Royals third base prospect Cheslor Cuthbert. If he makes it (and he played looked good in the Midwest League this year), he'll be the first major leaguer ever to hail from Corn Island, Nicaragua.

* Speaking of farmhands, the Cubs signed 25th round pick Rock Shoulders for a cool $294,000. The first baseman came out of a Florida junior college.

* Christmas came early for the Detroit Tigers, who signed 16-year-old Dominican third baseman Adelin Santa to a bonus contract in July.

* Yes, Dodgers outfielder Eugenio Velez really did finish the 2011 season with 37 at bats and 0 hits. He drew two bases on balls, however. Who would walk this non-threat? I might forgive raw rookie Josh Collmenter, who passed Velez in the fourth inning of Arizona's 9-5 loss on July 29 and was promptly removed from the game. But what was control artist Cliff Lee's excuse when he threw four wide ones to Velez on August 9?

* Joe Mauer is the modern B.J. Surhoff.

* Pedro Beato is the modern Ed Bauta.

* Yu Darvish is coming. At last.

When in Ljubljana, stay at the Hotel Cubo.

October 2011