2003 OQ REPORT

What is the Offensive Quotient?

The Offensive Quotient (OQ) is a formula for measuring a batter’s productivity and dominance. The concept was devised by the late Leo Leahy and introduced in his book Lumber Men (McFarland & Company, 1994). It is easy to calculate and understand.

Three simple steps lead to the OQ.

1. Outs = At Bats minus Hits

2. Base-To-Out Ratio (BTOR) = (Total bases + walks) divided by Outs

3. Offensive Quotient (OQ) = Player BTOR divided by League BTOR

The OQ is expressed without the decimal point.

A player whose BTOR is exactly the same as the league’s is, by definition, an average batter. His OQ would be 1.00, or 100 when we drop the decimal point. The OQ, then, uses the figure 100 to indicate average batting skill. Above 100, above average. Below 100, below average.

The OQ is a ratio-type statistic that makes two comparisons. It compares what a batter gives you to what he takes away, and compares that accomplishment with those of his peers.

Why is it valuable to know this? Because more bases = more runs = more wins. The guys you want are the guys who give you the most bases per out.

It seems sensible to me. That’s why it amazes me that teams like the Astros and White Sox bat weak sisters Willy Taveras (78 OQ) and Scott Podsednik (85 OQ) at or near the top of the order, where they make out after out without generating nearly enough bases. Managers Phil Garner and Ozzie Guillen have been doing that for two seasons now, and while it’s hard to second-guess two teams that have winning records, I’d argue that they’d have won more games if they’d deployed these guys differently. Sub-90 batters do not belong at the top of the batting order. Managers who place them there are burdening their team with more outs and fewer bases. They’re sacrificing runs, which means they’re sacrificing wins.

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LEAHY EXPLAINS THE OQ

Lumber Men appeared in the spring of 1994. By odd coincidence, that same spring Penguin Books published Essential Baseball by Norm Hitzges and Dave Lawson.Essential Baseball promotes an approach to offensive statistics that is eerily similar to Leahy’s, although the authors did not know one another at the time. Essential Baseball's formulae are more complicated and, I believe, less valid than the OQ.

Below is Leahy’s rationale for the OQ, from his introduction to Lumber Men:

“Roger Maris’ quest for the single-season home run record in 1961 is generally regarded today as heroic. But while it was happening, Maris, to his bewilderment and frustration, found himself more denigrated than praised. Maris’ talents were substantial; he was a skilled and intelligent defensive player, a dangerous hitter, and a major all-round contributor to a championship team. That he was no Babe Ruth was self-evident, for nobody ever was or will be. Yet many of the sportswriting experts of the day felt they needed to underscore the point by belittling Maris’ accomplishments. The Yankee right fielder, they wrote, was just a mediocre ballplayer. The proof? His .269 batting average!

“Implicit in this judgment was the notion that one could reasonably compare the players of the present to those of the past by merely checking the AVG column in the table of batting statistics. There were giants on the earth in those days, the scribes wrote in 1961, referring to the 1920s and 1930s. Maris? Rocky Colavito? Harmon Killebrew? Don’t mention them in the same breath as Al Simmons or Paul Waner or Ki Ki Cuyler!

“Since then the conventional wisdom has changed. Now one hears the assertion that players of different eras cannot be compared; playing conditions were different in the old days, so it’s a case of apples and oranges. Ironically this refrain, too, is employed to disparage the modern crop of baseball stars. One hears that although Hank Aaron hit more home runs than Ruth and Pete Rose banged out more hits than Ty Cobb, comparisons are not possible. The old stars, after all, had to travel by train, wear flannel uniforms, play doubleheaders and day games…

“Until now no effective statistical yardstick has existed to measure performance consistently in the face of evolving and fluctuating playing conditions. The issue is important because baseball fans want to compare. They want to know whether Pete Rose was a modern Ty Cobb. They look at today’s players and ask, who are the best of them, and how good are they?

“Baseball is competition, which is another way of saying comparison. Teams compete for supremacy, and managers, seeking a competitive edge, compare players every day as they choose their lineups. Who plays? Who sits on the bench? Who gets sent to the minors? Who gets called up? Fans second-guess these decisions, agreeing or disagreeing. All-Star selections are hotly argued, and opinion is rarely unanimous on the relative merits of contemporary third basemen or center fielders. Comparison is essential to fan interest, and particularly so in the area of batting, the most essential of all baseball skills.

“Players who never make it to the big leagues are usually those who can’t hit; there is always a place for a good hitter. Hits and runs stimulate and satisfy the appetites of baseball fans because they signify success. Scoring is more exciting than failing to score in a game like baseball, where an approximate equilibrium has always existed between offense and defense.

“Most baseball games are decided by just a few runs, many by one. A team is rarely so far behind that it cannot catch up with some judicious batting. Runs are not scored so frequently that they become meaningless, nor so infrequently that action and drama are wanting. The potential for scoring is always present, but not always fulfilled. Batting skill produces runs, but there is only so much of that skill to go around. As pundits often point out, even .300 hitters fail 70 percent of the time. A hitter’s job is to make something happen, and the great hitters are always bigger stars, more fascinating to the public, than the great pitchers, whose job it is to prevent something from happening. As General Francis A. Walker commented about the Civil War, “The sword is ever of higher honor than the shield.”

“It is true, of course, that playing conditions have changed. Stadium dimensions, the height of the pitcher’s mound, and the size of the strike zone have often been altered. Night games and hard artificial surfaces are modern phenomena which affect the physical environment of the game. Equipment has changed over the years, too. Even slight variations in the manufacture of the baseball have profound effects on baseball offense, and such changes have occurred many times in the game’s history. Meanwhile improved glove design has led to better fielding.

“New strategies have evolved. At one time managers expected their pitchers to go nine innings; later it became acceptable to remove pitchers who got tired. Today starting pitchers are relieved as a matter of course, and a batter may see a different pitcher every time he comes to bat. And there have been important rule changes, most notably the legalization of overhand pitching (1884), the lengthening of the pitching distance (1893), the foul-strike rule (1901 in the National League, 1903 in the American), the banning of the spitball (1920), and the introduction of the designated hitter (American League, 1973).

“Home Run Baker hit 9 home runs for the Philadelphia Athletics in 1914 and led the American League. The entire league hit 148 home runs that year in 631 games, with a batting average of .248. The explanation for these low totals is not that the American League hitters that year were a bunch of weaklings. They weren’t. In 1914 the baseball was wound more loosely than today’s article, and old balls were kept in the game much longer, even if battered and discolored. It was so difficult to hit one of these balls out of the park that few batters attempted such a low-percentage play, preferring instead to choke up on the bat and punch the ball to precise areas of the field.

“But every season has its dominant players, the ones who rise above the competition. The Offensive Quotient, or OQ, is a statistic that reveals who they were and are. It enables baseball fans to compare the productivity of players from different eras. Baker’s OQ of 141 (fifth in the league) shows that he was a greater offensive force in 1914 than Reggie Jackson was in 1975, when “Mr October” led the American League with 36 home runs (129 OQ, tenth in the league). Fans can use the OQ, introduced in this book, to answer questions about the batting abilities of all of baseball’s great stars…

“A player fails at bat by making an out. His team gets only three outs an inning, and each out that is made diminishes the team’s chances to score runs. A player succeeds at bat by getting on base. A player who reaches base may score a run (although his chances of doing so depend largely on the actions of players who follow him in the batting order), and he has not made an out. Anything he does to get on base and avoid making an out is desirable, and the more bases he earns, the better.

“A player can reach base by hitting safely, drawing a walk, getting hit by a pitched ball, or by benefiting from catcher’s interference. He may also reach base when an opponent makes an error or chooses to retire another baserunner. The OQ counts hits and walks because they are earned by the batter, and because they are statistically significant events for which individual player totals are available all the way back to 1876. Likewise, the OQ’s formula for outs is uncomplicated: Outs = At Bats minus Hits.

“Runs scored and driven in, while meaningful to record, are situational statistics that are less directly under the control of the individual batter. If there is no one on base, his hit will not produce an RBI; if no one drives him in, he won’t score a run. But whether he gets on base or makes an out depends largely on his own abilities. This is what the OQ considers. Stolen base/caught stealing data are also ignored. Baserunning, although it is offensive in nature, is a separate skill from batting, in much the same way that pitching and fielding are separate facets of defensive play.

“A baseball maxim (not universally endorsed) is that a walk is as good as a hit. The OQ accepts this principle as true. The player who has the patience to let four wide balls go by helps his team in two ways. He gets on base (from which position he may score a run), and he does not make an out. Hitting coaches who counsel players to “wait for their pitch” know that swinging at bad balls is, in general, a low-percentage play. Batters get few hits swinging at pitches outside the strike zone; they are more likely to make outs.”

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FRONTIERS OF FUTILITY

In the long history of baseball, Ozzie Guillen was the weakest-hitting player ever to have played regularly (at least 3 at bats + walks for each game his team played) for 5 or more seasons. Here are his lifetime OQs:

	1985	78
	1986	65
	1987	76
	1988	74
	1989	71
	1990	83
	1991	74
	1992	73
	1993	79
	1994	73
	1995	63
	1996	68
	1997	69
	1998	89
	1999	70
	2000	68

BOLD = Qualified as a regular.

Guillen’s career totals: 10 qualifying seasons with an average OQ of 73. Guillen’s offensive futility shattered conclusively the mark of the previous record holder, Alfredo Griffin, who registered a 76 OQ in 10 qualifying seasons, 1976-1993.

Infielder Hal Lanier just missed earning the distinction as worst-hitting regular ever. Lanier was far less accomplished a hitter than Griffin or even Guillen was, but he didn’t qualify as a regular for five or more seasons.

The 1964 San Francisco Giants must have thought they were getting a top-of-the-order guy when they summoned Lanier to the majors in mid-June. Lanier, who was just 21, had hit .305 in 405 minor league games, but no one seemed to notice (or care) that he had zero power and was a first-pitch swinger who rarely drew a walk. Manager Alvin Dark batted him first or second for the remainder of 1964, but the season was too far advanced for Lanier to earn the necessary at-bats to qualify for the batting title.

As a defensive infielder Lanier carried a glove too good to sit on the bench. But by 1966 he was batting at the bottom of the order, where he clearly belonged, and was often pinch hit for in the late innings of close games. Even in an era famous for ineffectual stickwork, Lanier stood out.

	1964	78
	1965	69
	1966	70
	1967	63
	1968	59
	1969	62
	1970	66
	1971	76
	1972	58
	1973	54

Lanier’s career totals: 4 qualifying seasons with an average OQ of 63.

Weak-hitting Felix Fermin played shortstop for four teams, most notably the Cleveland Indians, from 1987 through 1996. Fermin registered these OQs:

	1987	60
	1988	95
	1989	70
	1990	75
	1991	74
	1992	85
	1993	71
	1994	80
	1995	43
	1996	52

Fermin’s career totals: 2 qualifying seasons, with an average OQ of 71.

That's pretty feeble. Imagine my surprise when I read early in 2005 that the Indians had named Fermin hitting coach at Triple-A Buffalo! I guess it was a case of “Do what I say, not what I did.”

In Fermin's favor, he was a tough guy to strike out, with just 147 whiffs in 2,767 at bats (a 1 per 19 ratio).

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SUB-80 OQs WITH 600+ AT BATS

Their lack of productivity was embarrassing. Why, then, did they bat at the top of the order for an entire season?

	Ivy Olson, 1920 Brooklyn Robins	79
	Eddie Mulligan, 1921 Chicago White Sox	72
	Hughie Critz, 1930 Cin/NY	70
	Oscar Melillo, 1932 St Louis Browns	72
	Mark Koenig, 1934 Cincinnati Reds	69
	Frank Crosetti, 1939 New York Yankees	79
	Bob Kennedy, 1940 Chicago White Sox	73
	Woody Williams, 1944 Cincinnati Reds	76
	Sam Dente, 1950 Washington Senators	66
	Bobby Young, 1951 St Louis Browns	78
	Bill Bruton, 1953 Milwaukee Braves	77
	Nellie Fox, 1961 Chicago White Sox	78
	Bobby Richardson, 1961 New York Yankees	72
	Glenn Beckert, 1965 Chicago Cubs	74
	Cookie Rojas, 1968 Philadelphia Phillies	78
	Sandy Alomar Sr, 1969 Chi/Cal	72
	Sandy Alomar Sr, 1970 California Angels	76
	Horace Clarke, 1970 New York Yankees	75
	Larry Bowa, 1971 Philadelphia Phillies	76
	Roger Metzger, 1972 Houston Astros	74
	Gary Sutherland, 1974 Detroit Tigers	76
	Larry Bowa, 1976 Philadelphia Phillies	77
	Robin Yount, 1976 Milwaukee Brewers	79
	Dave Cash, 1978 Montreal Expos	79
	Rick Bosetti, 1979 Toronto Blue Jays	78
	Alfredo Griffin, 1980 Toronto Blue Jays	77
	Alfredo Griffin, 1985 Oakland A’s	74
	Vince Coleman, 1986 St Louis Cardinals	77
	Doug Glanville, 2000 Philadelphia Phillies	79
	Doug Glanville, 2001 Philadelphia Phillies	78
	Carl Crawford, 2003 Tampa Bay Bucs	79
	Angel Berroa, 2005 Kansas City Royals	79

9 of the American League’s 31 pitchers with 50 or more AB had OQs higher than Sam Dente’s 66 in 1950. Keeping him in the #2 hole all season cost manager Bucky Harris a lot of runs. Dente’s 1949 OQ for Washington was a miserable 76, but that was Ruthian compared to his 1950 output. When he didn’t improve significantly in 1951 (71 OQ) the Senators benched him, then traded him to the White Sox. He never played regularly in the majors again.

When in Bennington, stay at the Knotty Pine Motel.

December 2005

2003 OFFENSIVE LEADERS BY POSITION

AMERICAN LEAGUE

C	Jorge Posada
1B	Carlos Delgado
2B	Bret Boone
SS	Alex Rodriguez
3B	Bill Mueller
LF	Manny Ramirez
CF	Carlos Beltran
RF	Trot Nixon
DH	Frank Thomas

NATIONAL LEAGUE

C	Javy Lopez
1B	Todd Helton
2B	Marcus Giles
SS	Edgar Renteria
3B	Scott Rolen
LF	Barry Bonds
CF	Jim Edmonds
RF	Gary Sheffield

Bold indicates 2002 leaders.

To qualify for this list, a player must play at least half his team’s games at the defensive position indicated.

2003 AMERICAN LEAGUE OQ LEADERS

Rank	Player	Team	OQ

1	Delgado	TOR	158
2	Ramirez	BOS	158
3	Rodriguez	TEX	149
4	Nixon	BOS	148
5	Giambi	NY	145
6	Thomas	CHI	144
7	Ortiz	BOS	143
8	Posada	NY	139
9	Mueller	BOS	137
10	Martinez	SEA	135

11	Beltran	KC	134
12	Ordonez	CHI	132
13	Huff	TAM	131
14	Boone	SEA	129
15	Young	DET	128
16	Wells	TOR	126
17	Palmeiro	TEX	125
18	Koskie	MIN	123
19	Chavez	OAK	122
20	Anderson	ANA	121

21	Varitek	BOS	121
22	Mientkiewicz	MIN	121
23	Blalock	TEX	121
24	Everett	TEX/CHI	121
25	Salmon	ANA	119
26	Garciaparra	BOS	118
27	Durazo	OAK	117
28	Soriano	NY	115
29	Millar	BOS	114
30	Jeter	NY	113

31	Lee	TAM	112
32	Stewart	TOR/MIN	112
33	Lee	CHI	111
34	Gerut	CLE	111
35	Catalanotto	TOR	109
36	Williams	NY	109
37	Tejada	OAK	108
38	Teixeira	TEX	107
39	Ibanez	KC	107
40	Conine	BAL	106

41	Randa	KC	106
42	Matsui	NY	106
43	Cameron	SEA	106
44	Hinske	TOR	106
45	Kielty	MIN/TOR	106
46	Valentin	CHI	105
47	Pierzynski	MIN	105
48	Olerud	SEA	105
49	Pena	DET	105
50	Gibbons	BAL	104

51	Spiezio	ANA	104
52	Jones	MIN	102
53	Hernandez	OAK	102
54	Young	TEX	102
55	Hunter	MIN	101
56	Suzuki	SEA	100
57	Damon	BOS	100
58	Walker	BOS	100
59	Berroa	KC	99
60	Winn	SEA	99

61	Kennedy	ANA	96
62	Hatteberg	OAK	95
63	Baldelli	TAM	94
64	Crede	CHI	94
65	Hudson	TOR	92
66	Konerko	CHI	91
67	Higginson	DET	91
68	Blake	CLE	91
69	Roberts	BAL	90
70	Harvey	KC	90

71	Anderson	TAM	89
72	Relaford	KC	86
73	Ellis	OAK	86
74	Rivas	MIN	84
75	Long	OAK	84
76	Guzman	MIN	81
77	Hall	TAM	81
78	Batista	BAL	81
79	Crawford	TAM	79
80	Eckstein	ANA	77

81	Cruz	BAL	75

The 2003 American League base-to-out ratio was .709.

This list includes every player who had at least 3 (at bats + walks) for each game his team played.

2003 NATIONAL LEAGUE OQ LEADERS

Rank	Player	Team	OQ

1	Bonds	SF	245
2	Helton	COL	183
3	Pujols	STL	179
4	Lopez	ATL	162
5	Sheffield	ATL	161
6	Edmonds	STL	156
7	Thome	PHI	149
8	Giles	PIT/SD	149
9	Berkman	HOU	144
10	Gonzalez	ARI	143

11	Hidalgo	HOU	142
12	Jones,C	ATL	141
13	Sexson	MIL	140
14	Walker	COL	138
15	Rolen	STL	135
16	Abreu	PHI	134
17	Sosa	CHI	134
18	Jenkins	MIL	134
19	Bagwell	HOU	133
20	Giles	ATL	133

21	Lee	FLA	132
22	Sanders	PIT	130
23	Lowell	FLA	128
24	Renteria	STL	127
25	Vidro	MON	126
26	Wilkerson	MON	125
27	Wilson	COL	125
28	Finley	ARI	123
29	Payton	COL	120
30	Kent	HOU	119

31	Jones,A	ATL	119
32	Rodriguez	FLA	118
33	Cruz	SF	115
34	Alou	CHI	114
35	Green	LA	114
36	Podsednik	MIL	113
37	Loretta	SD	111
38	Cabrera	MON	111
39	Lieberthal	PHI	110
40	Lofton	PIT/CHI	109

41	Furcal	ATL	108
42	Polanco	PHI	107
43	Martinez	STL	106
44	Kendall	PIT	106
45	Burnitz	NY/LA	106
46	Ramirez	PIT/CHI	105
47	Castillo	FLA	105
48	Helms	MIL	105
49	Byrd	PHI	104
50	Belliard	COL	103

51	Grissom	SF	103
52	Castilla	ATL	101
53	Casey	CIN	101
54	Stynes	COL	100
55	Grudzielanek	CHI	100
56	Encarnacion	FLA	100
57	Burrell	PHI	98
58	Biggio	HOU	98
59	Burroughs	SD	98
60	Young	MIL/SF	98

61	Kotsay	SD	98
62	Alfonzo	SF	97
63	Gonzalez	FLA	97
64	Aurilia	SF	95
65	Pierre	FLA	94
66	Beltre	LA	92
67	Gonzalez	CHI	92
68	Rollins	PHI	92
69	Wigginton	NY	92
70	Lo Duca	LA	90

71	Cedeno	NY	89
72	Clayton	MIL	81
73	Hernandez	MI/CO/PI	81
74	Wilson,J	PIT	80
75	Chavez	MON	80
76	Ausmus	HOU	73
77	Cora	LA	71
78	Izturis	LA	69

The 2003 National League base-to-out ratio was .698.

This list includes every player who had at least 3 (at bats + walks) for each game his team played.

AMERICAN LEAGUE RECAP

On September 1 Peter Gammons wrote: “The third annual late-season slide for Ichiro Suzuki is partly an adjustment factor, as the American season is a month longer. But it raises a legitimate issue that has been much-discussed in Seattle: wouldn't he be a far better offensive player if he were more selective and worried less about hit totals. Those who wish he would be more selective think it would raise his on-base percentage in the leadoff position, and, more important, get him more hitters' counts which would in turn increase his power and production numbers.”

In the three years Ichiro has spent in Seattle, he’s proven that he’s a classic streak hitter, given both to long slumps and long hot streaks. Ichiro’s three seasons have produced similar results, OQs of 108, 111, and 100 with excellent baserunning and outfield defense. He’s never injured. With Ichiro in the lineup the Mariners have been winners.

You can “coulda, shoulda, woulda” all you want, but here’s the way I see it. Do you try to remake Ichiro, or be satisfied with what you have? How malleable is he? Ichiro will be 30 on opening day. What you see is what you get. He is who he is; he gives you what he has. If he doesn’t give it to you, he probably doesn’t have it to give. If the GM of the Mariners (whoever that will be) thinks the team will win more games with a power-and-production guy in right field, go out and get one. But they’ve done fine with Ichiro.

I’ve never heard of a game ending when a baserunner falls down and is tagged out after rounding third with the potential tying run. But that’s what happened to Baltimore’s Jack Cust with two out in the ninth inning on August 16. For the record, it was a 9-4-5-2-5 putout.

Oddly, because Baltimore manager Mike Hargrove was a famously patient offensive player in his day, not a single Oriole drew as many as 50 walks in 2003.

Did Hargrove deserve to be fired? Absolutely not. When you have to play an entire season with Deivi Cruz as your shortstop (worst OQ among AL regulars and no range in the field), what chance do you have? That the Orioles didn’t lose 100 games in either of the last two seasons is a tribute to Hargrove, who proved in Cleveland that he can win big if given talent to work with. Who could have done better with the dead wood Hargrove was handed in Baltimore? Orioles management should have offered him an extension instead of a pink slip. The fans did, after all, serenade Hargrove with chants of “Four more years!” at Baltimore’s final home game.

The 2003 American League OQ finish was the closest in history. Carlos Delgado edged Manny Ramirez by just .0014 (1.5839 to 1.5825).

Man-Ram was a double also-ran. While he rode the bench on the final day of the season, Bill Mueller copped the batting title by a single point, .326 to .325. Delgado, whose OQ stood at 1.5698 with a game to play, batted once in the finale and hit a home run, a grand slam to boot, to lift himself over the top. Why didn’t Manny play? Who knows?

Perhaps this was the revenge of the baseball gods. Earlier in September Manny was excoriated when he begged out of the lineup, too sick to play but not too sick to paint the town that night. After this incident Ken Rosenthal of The Sporting News expressed the conventional wisdom when he labeled Manny a “one-dimensional, high-maintenance knucklehead.” I wonder why everyone acted so surprised. When the Red Sox signed Manny in December 2000, what did they think they were getting? He’s exactly the same guy now that he was in Cleveland. And when you add it all up, Manny giveth a lot more than he taketh away. (And, like Ichiro, his first name alone is sufficient to identify him.)

The 2003 Boston Red Sox, incidentally, were the first team in history to boast 9 regulars with base-to-out ratios above the league average. The 1976 Cincinnati Reds had 8 (no DH).

OQs of 2003 Boston Red Sox (9 qualifiers)

C Jason Varitek 121

1B Kevin Millar 114

2B Todd Walker 100

SS Nomar Garciaparra 118

3B Bill Mueller 137

LF Manny Ramirez 158

CF Johnny Damon100

RF Trot Nixon 148

DH David Ortiz 143

Note: the OQs of both Walker and Damon were 1.0014.

Will Boston fans savor the remarkable success of this team? Don’t bet on it. Red Sox fans believe their team should never lose a game, their batters should never make an out, and their pitchers should never walk a batter or give up a hit. These beliefs produce a condition of chronic dissatisfaction that can never be relieved.

In August, when some of the Boston players protested this climate of negativity, they were accused of failing to understand that New England fans “live and die with the Red Sox.” That’s a phrase these fans often use to describe their feelings, and it’s only slightly exaggerated. But the players understand this perfectly well. They were simply asking, “Is this a GOOD thing?” They didn’t think so, and neither do I.

I can’t help but compare the atmosphere in Boston to what I witnessed in Montreal. The Expos draw 10,000 fans a game if they’re lucky, but those fans are tremendously enthusiastic, showering the players with encouragement and appreciation. After the Expos beat the Phillies, Expo Joe Vitiello told a reporter, “This type of crowd fires us up, and we want to go out there and give everything we’ve got.” Isn’t this a more satisfying experience for both athlete and spectator?

But how to explain the lack of numbers in the stands? I wonder if I have seen, in Montreal, the future of major league baseball. Montreal may be the cutting edge of a trend that is going to accelerate.

NATIONAL LEAGUE RECAP

The Cincinnati bullpen’s sad lexicon: These are the saddest of possible words, Riedling to Rietsma to Reith.

Los Angeles manager Jim Tracy insists that he’s interested in Cesar Izturis as a leadoff man in 2004, after experimenting with Izturis in the number-one hole during the last month of the season. Izturis is the guy who just completed his season with a 69 OQ, one of the worst in history for a major league regular. With just 10 stolen bases, Izturis doesn’t even have the saving grace of speed. Why would it make sense to give “Izzy” more plate appearances? If Izturis does lead off next year, he’ll join the company of notorious leadoff busts Larry Bowa, Alfredo Griffin, and Ozzie Guillen, guys who made a million outs and gave you little back. Needless to say, the Dodgers won’t win. Jim Tracy: what an offensive mind!

Pittsburgh’s Jason Kendall has revived the lost art of choking up on the bat. A free swinger with no power, he’s got to hit .325, as he did this year, to help you on offense (106 OQ).

Baseball’s best-named prospect has to be Milwaukee outfielder Peter Zoccolillo. I’m going to disregard his September callup numbers: 4 for 37 (3 singles and a double) with 2 walks and 13 strikeouts.

Hard as it may be to believe, Zoccolillo was not the least productive Milwaukee position player. Shortstop Enrique Cruz went 6 for 71 (5 singles and a double) with 4 walks and 30 strikeouts. He’s the reason Royce Clayton (81 OQ) still has a job.

Atlanta’s Javy Lopez had one of the best years ever by a catcher, combining eye-popping offense with a superb won-lost record behind the plate. Statistically it was as good as Johnny Bench’s best season, 1972. Lopez’s 162 OQ ranks below Mike Piazza’s 173 in 1997, but, without having the figures, I’d be willing to wager that his 2003 catcher won-lost was better than Piazza’s in 1997, when the Dodgers finished second with an 88-74 mark.

It’s been written that Lopez lost 30 pounds in the offseason. I don’t believe the weight he lost was simple fat. Lopez’s pre-2003 body, with its inflated torso and Popeye forearms supported by normal-sized legs, looked steroid-enhanced to me. It’s ironic that the trimmed-down 2003 Lopez found enough power to set a home run record. I suspect that’s the difference between being muscular and being muscle-bound.

Over the years I’ve marveled at Gene Woodling, Dick McAuliffe, John Wockenfuss, and Jeff Bagwell, to name a few, but I have never seen a goofier batting stance than the one Arizona’s Craig Counsell employed this season. It didn’t help. Counsell’s OQ was just 82.

THE CENTER OF INDIFFERENCE

The Mets were playing at Atlanta on Thursday, August 28. I watched the game on TV. Leading off the fourth inning, Mike Piazza hit a routine fly ball to right field. Atlanta’s Gary Sheffield didn’t need to move more than a step. As he lifted his glove with an air of cool indifference, the ball struck the leather and bounced out onto the grass. Unruffled, Sheffield ambled after it and returned it to the infield.

Did Sheffield’s nonchalance hurt the Braves? No, because Piazza couldn’t be bothered to run hard. After making contact he commenced a slow jog to first base. Halfway down the line he made a move to veer off toward the Mets dugout, which he arrested only when informed, by the first base coach, that the ball was still in play. Piazza completed his journey at the first base bag, although he should have been on second. He appeared almost disappointed that, thanks to Sheffield’s error, he would now be obliged to run the bases. As events transpired, the inning ended with Piazza on third. He would certainly have scored if he’d put forth a normal effort after hitting the ball.

One lazy play, then, cancelled out another. Net result: zero. It’s surely not the type of baseball I want to see.

“Hustle” is a word one rarely reads on the sports page any more. But if the concept has ceased to be important to many players and commentators, it still has meaning to the baseball fan, who remains, thank God, disinclined to pay top dollar to watch athletes loaf. Sadly, it always seems to be the big stars who play like they don’t care. They seem to feel that it isn’t cool to exert themselves, that their exalted status entitles them to coast. But this attitude produces a spectacle that is unappealing to most of the paying public.

Perhaps, if this trend continues, the panjandrums of baseball will consider restoring the old custom of the “courtesy runner.” In this age of specialization, anything is possible. Maybe I shouldn’t be putting ideas in anyone’s head. I can hear the discussion now: “The fans don’t pay to see Mo Vaughn run.” (“The fans don’t pay to see pitchers hit,” they used to say to justify the DH rule.) Then where? The courtesy fielder? 3-platoon baseball? Baseball is still the only major sport which does not allow a substituted-for player to return to the field.

If baseball is a world, in Montreal the crust and the mantle have worn away, leaving only the small molten core. The casual fans have opted out, and only the most devoted baseball lovers remain. It’s happening in every city, and in Montreal the process is simply more advanced. Attendance has eroded throughout the major leagues for the second consecutive season, while ticket and concession prices continue to rise. More and more fans have decided that the product isn’t entertaining enough to justify its cost.

THE ANTI-DRAWING CARD

What team was baseball’s worst drawing card in 2003? That is, which team attracted the fewest fans when playing on the road?

The answer is the Cleveland Indians, one of only two teams not to draw 2 million fans on the road. (Detroit was the other.) Hard to believe now that the Indians were a powerhouse just a few years ago.

Last year’s Indians employed no fewer than 8 pitchers (Nick Bierbrodt, David Cortes, David Elder, Alex Herrera, Aaron Myette, Chad Paronto, Jason Phillips, and Jerry Riggan) with ERAs of 9 or higher. A 9.00 ERA means that you gave up a run for every inning you pitched. Collectively they pitched 74 innings and surrendered 114 hits and 83 earned runs. They struck out 50 and walked 47. They won 1 and lost 6 with a collective ERA of 10.09.

At least the Indians had the sense to get those guys out of there as soon as their ineffectiveness became obvious. Cleveland’s team ERA of 4.21 ranked 5th in the American League.

The Indians’ Phillips really ought to be pitching in New York, where he could confuse hitters by teaming up with Mets catcher Jason Phillips for an all-Jason Phillips battery.

Incidentally, the best goggles in baseball belong to Jason Phillips the catcher. He can hit, too (110 OQ). A future star?

RUMINATIONS

* Countdown to Cooperstown: Robby Alomar has 2679 hits. He’ll be 36 on Opening Day. Whose uniform will he be wearing?

* Is Alfonso Soriano the modern Juan Samuel?

* 73 of Jim Edmonds’ 123 hits went for extra bases.

* Fred McGriff is still 9 HRs short of 500. He’ll be 40 on Opening Day. If McGriff reaches 500, he won’t be the last to do so. Before 2010 we’ll see many new members of this once-exclusive club.

* Luis Gonzalez is the Roy Scheider of baseball.

* Is this the end of Rickey? I’m afraid it is. With no kind of glove in left field and an 83 OQ that conspicuous failed to ignite the Dodger offense, he has surely sung his swan song.

* When in Leghorn, stay at the Hotel La Vedetta.

October 2003