2001 OQ REPORT

What is the Offensive Quotient?

The Offensive Quotient (OQ) is a formula for measuring a batter’s productivity and dominance. The concept was devised by the late Leo Leahy and introduced in his book Lumber Men (McFarland & Company, 1994). It is easy to calculate and understand.

Three simple steps lead to the OQ.

1. Outs = At Bats minus Hits

2. Base-To-Out Ratio (BTOR) = (Total bases + walks) divided by Outs

3. Offensive Quotient (OQ) = Player BTOR divided by League BTOR

The OQ is expressed without the decimal point.

A player whose BTOR is exactly the same as the league’s is, by definition, an average batter. His OQ would be 1.00, or 100 when we drop the decimal point. The OQ, then, uses the figure 100 to indicate average batting skill. Above 100, above average. Below 100, below average.

The OQ is a ratio-type statistic that makes two comparisons. It compares what a batter gives you to what he takes away, and compares that accomplishment with those of his peers.

Why is it valuable to know this? Because more bases = more runs = more wins. The guys you want are the guys who give you the most bases per out.

It seems sensible to me. That’s why it amazes me that teams like the Astros and White Sox bat weak sisters Willy Taveras (78 OQ) and Scott Podsednik (85 OQ) at or near the top of the order, where they make out after out without generating nearly enough bases. Managers Phil Garner and Ozzie Guillen have been doing that for two seasons now, and while it’s hard to second-guess two teams that have winning records, I’d argue that they’d have won more games if they’d deployed these guys differently. Sub-90 batters do not belong at the top of the batting order. Managers who place them there are burdening their team with more outs and fewer bases. They’re sacrificing runs, which means they’re sacrificing wins.

Back to the top

LEAHY EXPLAINS THE OQ

Lumber Men appeared in the spring of 1994. By odd coincidence, that same spring Penguin Books published Essential Baseball by Norm Hitzges and Dave Lawson.Essential Baseball promotes an approach to offensive statistics that is eerily similar to Leahy’s, although the authors did not know one another at the time. Essential Baseball's formulae are more complicated and, I believe, less valid than the OQ.

Below is Leahy’s rationale for the OQ, from his introduction to Lumber Men:

“Roger Maris’ quest for the single-season home run record in 1961 is generally regarded today as heroic. But while it was happening, Maris, to his bewilderment and frustration, found himself more denigrated than praised. Maris’ talents were substantial; he was a skilled and intelligent defensive player, a dangerous hitter, and a major all-round contributor to a championship team. That he was no Babe Ruth was self-evident, for nobody ever was or will be. Yet many of the sportswriting experts of the day felt they needed to underscore the point by belittling Maris’ accomplishments. The Yankee right fielder, they wrote, was just a mediocre ballplayer. The proof? His .269 batting average!

“Implicit in this judgment was the notion that one could reasonably compare the players of the present to those of the past by merely checking the AVG column in the table of batting statistics. There were giants on the earth in those days, the scribes wrote in 1961, referring to the 1920s and 1930s. Maris? Rocky Colavito? Harmon Killebrew? Don’t mention them in the same breath as Al Simmons or Paul Waner or Ki Ki Cuyler!

“Since then the conventional wisdom has changed. Now one hears the assertion that players of different eras cannot be compared; playing conditions were different in the old days, so it’s a case of apples and oranges. Ironically this refrain, too, is employed to disparage the modern crop of baseball stars. One hears that although Hank Aaron hit more home runs than Ruth and Pete Rose banged out more hits than Ty Cobb, comparisons are not possible. The old stars, after all, had to travel by train, wear flannel uniforms, play doubleheaders and day games…

“Until now no effective statistical yardstick has existed to measure performance consistently in the face of evolving and fluctuating playing conditions. The issue is important because baseball fans want to compare. They want to know whether Pete Rose was a modern Ty Cobb. They look at today’s players and ask, who are the best of them, and how good are they?

“Baseball is competition, which is another way of saying comparison. Teams compete for supremacy, and managers, seeking a competitive edge, compare players every day as they choose their lineups. Who plays? Who sits on the bench? Who gets sent to the minors? Who gets called up? Fans second-guess these decisions, agreeing or disagreeing. All-Star selections are hotly argued, and opinion is rarely unanimous on the relative merits of contemporary third basemen or center fielders. Comparison is essential to fan interest, and particularly so in the area of batting, the most essential of all baseball skills.

“Players who never make it to the big leagues are usually those who can’t hit; there is always a place for a good hitter. Hits and runs stimulate and satisfy the appetites of baseball fans because they signify success. Scoring is more exciting than failing to score in a game like baseball, where an approximate equilibrium has always existed between offense and defense.

“Most baseball games are decided by just a few runs, many by one. A team is rarely so far behind that it cannot catch up with some judicious batting. Runs are not scored so frequently that they become meaningless, nor so infrequently that action and drama are wanting. The potential for scoring is always present, but not always fulfilled. Batting skill produces runs, but there is only so much of that skill to go around. As pundits often point out, even .300 hitters fail 70 percent of the time. A hitter’s job is to make something happen, and the great hitters are always bigger stars, more fascinating to the public, than the great pitchers, whose job it is to prevent something from happening. As General Francis A. Walker commented about the Civil War, “The sword is ever of higher honor than the shield.”

“It is true, of course, that playing conditions have changed. Stadium dimensions, the height of the pitcher’s mound, and the size of the strike zone have often been altered. Night games and hard artificial surfaces are modern phenomena which affect the physical environment of the game. Equipment has changed over the years, too. Even slight variations in the manufacture of the baseball have profound effects on baseball offense, and such changes have occurred many times in the game’s history. Meanwhile improved glove design has led to better fielding.

“New strategies have evolved. At one time managers expected their pitchers to go nine innings; later it became acceptable to remove pitchers who got tired. Today starting pitchers are relieved as a matter of course, and a batter may see a different pitcher every time he comes to bat. And there have been important rule changes, most notably the legalization of overhand pitching (1884), the lengthening of the pitching distance (1893), the foul-strike rule (1901 in the National League, 1903 in the American), the banning of the spitball (1920), and the introduction of the designated hitter (American League, 1973).

“Home Run Baker hit 9 home runs for the Philadelphia Athletics in 1914 and led the American League. The entire league hit 148 home runs that year in 631 games, with a batting average of .248. The explanation for these low totals is not that the American League hitters that year were a bunch of weaklings. They weren’t. In 1914 the baseball was wound more loosely than today’s article, and old balls were kept in the game much longer, even if battered and discolored. It was so difficult to hit one of these balls out of the park that few batters attempted such a low-percentage play, preferring instead to choke up on the bat and punch the ball to precise areas of the field.

“But every season has its dominant players, the ones who rise above the competition. The Offensive Quotient, or OQ, is a statistic that reveals who they were and are. It enables baseball fans to compare the productivity of players from different eras. Baker’s OQ of 141 (fifth in the league) shows that he was a greater offensive force in 1914 than Reggie Jackson was in 1975, when “Mr October” led the American League with 36 home runs (129 OQ, tenth in the league). Fans can use the OQ, introduced in this book, to answer questions about the batting abilities of all of baseball’s great stars…

“A player fails at bat by making an out. His team gets only three outs an inning, and each out that is made diminishes the team’s chances to score runs. A player succeeds at bat by getting on base. A player who reaches base may score a run (although his chances of doing so depend largely on the actions of players who follow him in the batting order), and he has not made an out. Anything he does to get on base and avoid making an out is desirable, and the more bases he earns, the better.

“A player can reach base by hitting safely, drawing a walk, getting hit by a pitched ball, or by benefiting from catcher’s interference. He may also reach base when an opponent makes an error or chooses to retire another baserunner. The OQ counts hits and walks because they are earned by the batter, and because they are statistically significant events for which individual player totals are available all the way back to 1876. Likewise, the OQ’s formula for outs is uncomplicated: Outs = At Bats minus Hits.

“Runs scored and driven in, while meaningful to record, are situational statistics that are less directly under the control of the individual batter. If there is no one on base, his hit will not produce an RBI; if no one drives him in, he won’t score a run. But whether he gets on base or makes an out depends largely on his own abilities. This is what the OQ considers. Stolen base/caught stealing data are also ignored. Baserunning, although it is offensive in nature, is a separate skill from batting, in much the same way that pitching and fielding are separate facets of defensive play.

“A baseball maxim (not universally endorsed) is that a walk is as good as a hit. The OQ accepts this principle as true. The player who has the patience to let four wide balls go by helps his team in two ways. He gets on base (from which position he may score a run), and he does not make an out. Hitting coaches who counsel players to “wait for their pitch” know that swinging at bad balls is, in general, a low-percentage play. Batters get few hits swinging at pitches outside the strike zone; they are more likely to make outs.”

Back to the top

FRONTIERS OF FUTILITY

In the long history of baseball, Ozzie Guillen was the weakest-hitting player ever to have played regularly (at least 3 at bats + walks for each game his team played) for 5 or more seasons. Here are his lifetime OQs:

	1985	78
	1986	65
	1987	76
	1988	74
	1989	71
	1990	83
	1991	74
	1992	73
	1993	79
	1994	73
	1995	63
	1996	68
	1997	69
	1998	89
	1999	70
	2000	68

BOLD = Qualified as a regular.

Guillen’s career totals: 10 qualifying seasons with an average OQ of 73. Guillen’s offensive futility shattered conclusively the mark of the previous record holder, Alfredo Griffin, who registered a 76 OQ in 10 qualifying seasons, 1976-1993.

Infielder Hal Lanier just missed earning the distinction as worst-hitting regular ever. Lanier was far less accomplished a hitter than Griffin or even Guillen was, but he didn’t qualify as a regular for five or more seasons.

The 1964 San Francisco Giants must have thought they were getting a top-of-the-order guy when they summoned Lanier to the majors in mid-June. Lanier, who was just 21, had hit .305 in 405 minor league games, but no one seemed to notice (or care) that he had zero power and was a first-pitch swinger who rarely drew a walk. Manager Alvin Dark batted him first or second for the remainder of 1964, but the season was too far advanced for Lanier to earn the necessary at-bats to qualify for the batting title.

As a defensive infielder Lanier carried a glove too good to sit on the bench. But by 1966 he was batting at the bottom of the order, where he clearly belonged, and was often pinch hit for in the late innings of close games. Even in an era famous for ineffectual stickwork, Lanier stood out.

	1964	78
	1965	69
	1966	70
	1967	63
	1968	59
	1969	62
	1970	66
	1971	76
	1972	58
	1973	54

Lanier’s career totals: 4 qualifying seasons with an average OQ of 63.

Weak-hitting Felix Fermin played shortstop for four teams, most notably the Cleveland Indians, from 1987 through 1996. Fermin registered these OQs:

	1987	60
	1988	95
	1989	70
	1990	75
	1991	74
	1992	85
	1993	71
	1994	80
	1995	43
	1996	52

Fermin’s career totals: 2 qualifying seasons, with an average OQ of 71.

That's pretty feeble. Imagine my surprise when I read early in 2005 that the Indians had named Fermin hitting coach at Triple-A Buffalo! I guess it was a case of “Do what I say, not what I did.”

In Fermin's favor, he was a tough guy to strike out, with just 147 whiffs in 2,767 at bats (a 1 per 19 ratio).

Back to the top

SUB-80 OQs WITH 600+ AT BATS

Their lack of productivity was embarrassing. Why, then, did they bat at the top of the order for an entire season?

	Ivy Olson, 1920 Brooklyn Robins	79
	Eddie Mulligan, 1921 Chicago White Sox	72
	Hughie Critz, 1930 Cin/NY	70
	Oscar Melillo, 1932 St Louis Browns	72
	Mark Koenig, 1934 Cincinnati Reds	69
	Frank Crosetti, 1939 New York Yankees	79
	Bob Kennedy, 1940 Chicago White Sox	73
	Woody Williams, 1944 Cincinnati Reds	76
	Sam Dente, 1950 Washington Senators	66
	Bobby Young, 1951 St Louis Browns	78
	Bill Bruton, 1953 Milwaukee Braves	77
	Nellie Fox, 1961 Chicago White Sox	78
	Bobby Richardson, 1961 New York Yankees	72
	Glenn Beckert, 1965 Chicago Cubs	74
	Cookie Rojas, 1968 Philadelphia Phillies	78
	Sandy Alomar Sr, 1969 Chi/Cal	72
	Sandy Alomar Sr, 1970 California Angels	76
	Horace Clarke, 1970 New York Yankees	75
	Larry Bowa, 1971 Philadelphia Phillies	76
	Roger Metzger, 1972 Houston Astros	74
	Gary Sutherland, 1974 Detroit Tigers	76
	Larry Bowa, 1976 Philadelphia Phillies	77
	Robin Yount, 1976 Milwaukee Brewers	79
	Dave Cash, 1978 Montreal Expos	79
	Rick Bosetti, 1979 Toronto Blue Jays	78
	Alfredo Griffin, 1980 Toronto Blue Jays	77
	Alfredo Griffin, 1985 Oakland A’s	74
	Vince Coleman, 1986 St Louis Cardinals	77
	Doug Glanville, 2000 Philadelphia Phillies	79
	Doug Glanville, 2001 Philadelphia Phillies	78
	Carl Crawford, 2003 Tampa Bay Bucs	79
	Angel Berroa, 2005 Kansas City Royals	79

9 of the American League’s 31 pitchers with 50 or more AB had OQs higher than Sam Dente’s 66 in 1950. Keeping him in the #2 hole all season cost manager Bucky Harris a lot of runs. Dente’s 1949 OQ for Washington was a miserable 76, but that was Ruthian compared to his 1950 output. When he didn’t improve significantly in 1951 (71 OQ) the Senators benched him, then traded him to the White Sox. He never played regularly in the majors again.

When in Bennington, stay at the Knotty Pine Motel.

December 2005

2001 OFFENSIVE LEADERS BY POSITION

AMERICAN LEAGUE

C	Jorge Posada
1B	Jason Giambi
2B	Roberto Alomar
SS	Alex Rodriguez
3B	Troy Glaus
LF	Frank Catalanotto
CF	Bernie Williams
RF	Juan Gonzalez
DH	Manny Ramirez

NATIONAL LEAGUE

C	Mike Piazza
1B	Todd Helton
2B	Jeff Kent
SS	Rich Aurilia
3B	Chipper Jones
LF	Barry Bonds
CF	Jim Edmonds
RF	Sammy Sosa

Bold indicates 2000 leaders.

To qualify for this list, a player must play at least half his team’s games at the defensive position indicated.

2001 AMERICAN LEAGUE OQ LEADERS

Rank	Player	Team	OQ

1	Giambi,Ja	OAK	194
2	Thome	CLE	166
3	Ramirez	BOS	155
4	Rodriguez,A	TEX	153
5	Martinez	SEA	150
6	Alomar	CLE	144
7	Delgado	TOR	143
8	Palmeiro	TEX	142
9	Gonzalez	CLE	139
10	Williams,B	NY	136

11	Boone	SEA	135
12	Glaus	ANA	134
13	Burks	CLE	134
14	Sweeney	KC	133
15	Ordonez	CHI	132
16	Olerud	SEA	128
17	Nixon	BOS	128
18	Clark	DET	124
19	Chavez	OAK	122
20	Beltran	KC	121

21	Catalanotto	TEX	121
22	Mientkiewicz	MIN	119
23	Koskie	MIN	118
24	Valentin	CHI	118
25	Cruz	TOR	118
26	Konerko	CHI	118
27	Posada	NY	117
28	Jeter	NY	117
29	Cameron	SEA	117
30	Higginson	DET	116

31	Conine	BAL	115
32	Martinez	NY	112
33	Dye	KC/OAK	110
34	Stewart	TOR	110
35	Durham	CHI	110
36	Mondesi	TOR	109
37	Suzuki	SEA	108
38	Kapler	TEX	108
39	Halter	DET	108
40	Salmon	ANA	107

41	Vaughn	TAM	106
42	O’Neill	NY	106
43	Grieve	TAM	105
44	Guzman	MIN	105
45	Tejada	OAK	105
46	Lee	CHI	103
47	Anderson	ANA	103
48	Richard	BAL	101
49	Hunter	MIN	101
50	Menechino	OAK	101

51	Fullmer	TOR	100
52	Spiezio	ANA	99
53	Long	OAK	97
54	Jones	MIN	97
55	Offerman	BOS	94
56	Lofton	CLE	93
57	Soriano	NY	93
58	Hernandez	OAK	93
59	Cedeno	DET	93
60	Batista	TOR/BAL	91

61	Bell	SEA	90
62	Guillen	SEA	90
63	Macias	DET	88
64	Easley	DET	87
65	Erstad	ANA	87
66	Knoblauch	NY	87
67	Damon	OAK	87
68	Randa	KC	86
69	Gonzalez	TOR	86
70	Eckstein	ANA	85

71	Rivas	MIN	83
72	Kennedy	ANA	83
73	Vizquel	CLE	82
74	Hairston	BAL	78
75	Anderson	BAL	78
76	Ripken	BAL	77

The 2001 American League base-to-out ratio was .710, down from .762 in 2000.

This list includes every player who had at least 3 (at bats + walks) for each game his team played.

2001 NATIONAL LEAGUE OQ LEADERS

Rank	Player	Team	OQ

1	Bonds	SF	260
2	Sosa	CHI	197
3	Helton	COL	181
4	Walker	COL	180
5	Gonzalez	ARI	179
6	Berkman	HOU	165
7	Jones,C	ATL	164
8	Sheffield	LA	157
9	Pujols	STL	153
10	Giles	PIT	153

11	Edmonds	STL	152
12	Bagwell	HOU	148
13	Nevin	SD	146
14	Abreu	PHI	144
15	Green	LA	144
16	Piazza	NY	143
17	Floyd	FLA	142
18	Alou	HOU	141
19	Klesko	SD	139
20	Guerrero	MON	136

21	Aurilia	SF	135
22	Millar	FLA	133
23	Lo Duca	LA	131
24	Rolen	PHI	126
25	Sexson	MIL	126
26	Sanders	ARI	125
27	Kent	SF	124
28	Grace	ARI	122
29	Burnitz	MIL	122
30	Ramirez	PIT	122

31	Vander Wal	PIT/SF	115
32	Burrell	PHI	114
33	Cirillo	COL	114
34	Vidro	MON	114
35	Ventura	NY	113
36	Biggio	HOU	112
37	Young	CIN	111
38	Wilson	FLA	111
39	Lee	FLA	111
40	Walker	COL/CIN	111

41	Jordan	ATL	111
42	Stevens	MON	110
43	Casey	CIN	110
44	Hidalgo	HOU	109
45	Trammell	SD	108
46	Lee	PHI	107
47	Jones,A	ATL	104
48	Lowell	FLA	104
49	Bell	ARI	104
50	Finley	ARI	102

51	Johnson	FLA	102
52	Pierre	COL	101
53	Zeile	NY	98
54	Anderson	PHI	98
55	Cabrera	MON	97
56	Hernandez	MIL	97
57	Counsell	ARI	97
58	Alfonzo	NY	96
59	Rollins	PHI	96
60	Vina	STL	95

61	Ochoa	CIN/COL	95
62	Gutierrez	CHI	95
63	Surhoff	ATL	94
64	Davis	SD	94
65	Young	CHI	91
66	Young	PIT	91
67	Beltre	LA	90
68	Castillo	FLA	89
69	Lugo	HOU	89
70	Polanco	STL	87

71	Grudzielanek	LA	86
72	Renteria	STL	86
73	Kendall	PIT	83
74	Blum	MON	83
75	Gonzalez	FLA	82
76	Santiago	SF	80
77	Barrett	MON	79
78	Glanville	PHI	78
79	Ordonez	NY	77
80	Womack	ARI	75

The 2001 National League base-to-out ratio was .707, down from .737 in 2000.

This list includes every player who had at least 3 (at bats + walks) for each game his team played.

Why did offensive production dip so significantly in both leagues? It had to be the much-publicized enforcement of the rulebook strike zone, although the umpires seemed less insistent about it by the end of the season. Major league offense in 2001 dropped almost, but not quite, back to pre-1994 levels. In my opinion, that’s good news, and I hope the umps stay conscientious. A league BTOR of no more than .700 is best for the competitive balance between offense and defense that makes baseball so enjoyable.

AMERICAN LEAGUE RECAP

Ichiro Suzuki’s perhaps surprisingly low 108 OQ doesn’t reflect his value to Seattle. For starters, he’s an excellent right fielder and a high-percentage (80%) base stealer. Right field is usually regarded as a “power” position, and Suzuki neither hits for power nor draws walks. But I’ll take his 108 OQ in the leadoff hole. What settles it for me is Seattle’s winning percentage with Suzuki leading off every day.

As a general rule I watch TV baseball with the sound off, but for some reason I forgot to mute the set the other day when the Mariners were playing, and one of the announcers actually said something I liked. He named Suzuki the American League’s “MEP” : Most Exciting Player. I couldn’t agree more. And are the pundits still crying that Suzuki’s age and experience in Japan should disqualify him for Rookie of the Year honors? Well, if he didn’t play American major league baseball before this season, he’s a rookie in America. If he were a graybeard of 35, he’d still be a rookie. End of story.

There was no worse trade in the major leagues this season than Minnesota’s exchange of Matt Lawton for the Mets’ Rick Reed. Reed couldn’t adapt to the AL, and without Lawton the Twins promptly dived into the tank with unprecedented velocity. Lawton was a 121 OQ performer in Minnesota, but that figure dropped 30 points in New York, not adequate for a guy who plays right field.

Do you think the Blue Jays would trade Shawn Green for Raul Mondesi again? No wonder GM Gord Ash got fired.

Calvin Pickering, Boston’s new man-mountain first baseman, is listed at 6-5, 290, but most observers believe that’s conservative. Pickering makes Mo Vaughn look like Stuffy McInnis. Pickering bats left, like incumbent Brian Daubach, and his 125 OQ in September duty was comparable to Daubach’s 122. The word on Vaughn, by the way, is that the Angels are willing to give him away to any team that will assume his massive contract. There have been no takers so far. After losing the entire season to injury, Vaughn says he’s willing to DH. Is a return to Boston, the only town that ever loved him, in Vaughn’s future, or is he already forgotten in the Hub?

Boston has been crowing about rookie third baseman Shea Hillenbrand, who just missed qualifying as a regular in 2001. But if Hillenbrand’s offensive production doesn’t improve (80 OQ), he’ll have to field like Brooks Robinson if he wants to keep his job. Although Robinson recorded an even uglier 76 OQ in his first season as a major league regular, 1958, his superior glove work convinced the Orioles to stick with him. Robinson learned to hit. If he hadn’t, he would have been Mark Belanger.

Baltimore third sacker Cal Ripken was the American League’s weakest-hitting regular in 2001. Some journalists (the same ones who deplored Ripken’s consecutive-game streak right till the end) took the Orioles to task for keeping him in the lineup in September, complaining that Ripken’s selfishness deprived the team of a chance to audition young talent. My question is, what talent? Baltimore continues to have one of the least productive farm systems in the majors. Besides Ripken, who came up in 1981 (!) the only homegrown regular in the Baltimore lineup this season was second baseman Jerry Hairston. Hairston was a complete bust, and at age 25, he can’t use youth as an excuse.

Remember 1996, when the Orioles switched Ripken from shortstop to third base because they just had to make room for hotshot shortstop prospect Manny Alexander? Alexander got 7 hits, all singles, and struck out in 27 of the 68 at-bats the team gave him before they mercifully pulled the plug. He’s out of the major leagues just 5 years later.

It was true during “The Streak,” and it was still true in 2001: if Ripken was a better player than anybody they could have replaced him with (and he was), Ripken deserved to be in the lineup. It’s that simple.

By the way, how come sports journalists, and even box scores, in 2001 still referred to Ripken as Cal Ripken Junior? Did they think we’d confuse him with Cal Ripken Senior, who never played major league baseball and has been dead for two years? Jerry Hairston Senior played in the major leagues for 14 seasons, but nobody calls his son and namesake Jerry Hairston Junior. Just wondering.

NATIONAL LEAGUE RECAP

Luis Gonzalez was one of a staggering FOUR major league players who produced 100 extra base hits in 2001. Oddly enough, they were all National Leaguers. The others were Sammy Sosa, Barry Bonds, and Todd Helton. 100 EBH is an extremely rare feat in baseball history.

You may wonder why the NL had so many players in the upper reaches of offensive stardom. Bernie Williams’ 136 OQ was good for 10th place on the AL list, but he would have finished 20th had he toiled in the NL last season. Here’s the explanation: the NL had a host of semi-regulars with a lot of plate appearances but very low OQs who, collectively, helped balance out the performance of the stars and drive the league average down to 100 (1.00). These offensive stiffs included Atlanta’s Quilvio Veras, Rico Brogna, Ken Caminiti, and Wes Helms; Chicago’s Joe Girardi and Todd Hundley; Cincinnati’s Pokey Reese, Jason Larue, and Frank Castro; Florida’s Dave Berg; Houston’s Brad Ausmus; Los Angeles’ Eric Karros, Tom Goodwin, Alex Cora, and Marquis Grissom; Milwaukee’s Henry Blanco; Montreal’s Milton Bradley and Peter Bergeron; New York’s Timo Perez; Philadelphia’s Johnny Estrada; Pittsburgh’s Jack Wilson and Pat Meares; St Louis’s Mike Matheny; San Diego’s Damian Jackson; and San Francisco’s Ramon Martinez, Pedro Feliz, and Calvin Murray.

Albert Pujols seems to have sprung full-grown from the forehead of Zeus. Was Pujols the best rookie ever? If you’re talking about the best rookie in over a century, well, Pujols was right up there. Nobody’s likely to top the 210-OQ impact that slugging Pete Browning made when Louisville signed him in 1882.

Pujols set several rookie offensive “counting stat” records. But when you normalize for league performance you can see that Pujols’ 153 OQ, spectacular as it was, ranks a bit below Ted Williams’ 166 in 1939, Carlton Fisk’s 161 in 1972, Johnny Mize’s 160 in 1936, Richie Allen’s 160 in 1964, Rico Carty’s 159 in 1964, Fred Lynn’s 158 in 1975, Elmer Flick’s 156 in 1898, and Stan Musial’s 155 in 1942. (Paul Waner recorded a 151 in 1926.)

Pujols was tremendously valuable to the Cardinals in 2001. There’s no way they would have made the postseason without him. He’s just 21, too. If Albert Pujols and Adam Dunn were playing in New York instead of St Louis and Cincinnati, you’d be hearing a lot more about these youthful stars.

Pujols’ fellow Cardinal, J.D. Drew, was a stellar 160 performer when he wasn’t on the DL. That’s superstar production. I hope everyone noticed that the Cardinals got a lot better after they jettisoned Ray Lankford. Lankford’s 123 OQ didn’t nearly compensate for his defensive deficiencies and complaints about getting no respect. The guy struck out 145 times in just 389 at bats, and the Cardinals already had a guy who could strike out (Mark McGwire, 118 in 299 AB).

In the realm of the strikeout, both Milwaukee’s Jose Hernandez and Cleveland’s Jim Thome with 185 whiffs fell just short of Bobby Bonds’ single-season record of 189, set way back in 1970. Keep flailing away, guys, it will happen for you one of these years.

Barry Larkin’s production (OQ 104) is still adequate when he’s healthy, but he’s never healthy and will probably never be healthy again. Why the Reds signed this brittle 37-year-old to an expensive longterm deal baffles me. Cincinnati’s other big-bucks commitment, Ken Griffey (OQ 124), was about as good a player this year as former Red Reggie Sanders of Arizona, although Griffey doesn’t hustle and is a lot better paid.

(How did a dumb organization like the Reds end up with a prospect like Dunn, who gave them a 141 OQ in the 66 games he got into after they called him up? You have to like this kid’s future.)

In Colorado, after two years of trying to win with “pitching, speed, and defense” (management’s words), do you think they’ve learned their lesson yet? In that ballpark, why would you want to load up with punch-and-judy hitters?

San Diego left fielder Rickey Henderson (OQ 103) wants to come back for another year, but now that he has his 3000 hits and owns the runs and walks records, I doubt if anyone will sign him. This season proved to me, however, that Henderson can still be useful as a utility outfielder, and he’s willing to accept the role of a nonregular. Henderson’s fascinating career has been unique in baseball history.

Fred McGriff was even better in Chicago (140 OQ) than he was in Tampa Bay (135). Another welcome development (for McGriff and baseball fans in general) is that McGriff seems finally to have shed baseball’s most ridiculous nickname, “The Crime Dog.” I suspect that the Cubs plan to keep McGriff until first base prospect Aesop Choi is finally ready. They insist that Choi’s talent is no fable.

I don’t like Arizona’s decision to employ Tony Womack, whose 75 OQ was the lowest of all 156 major league regulars, as a leadoff man. Why would you want to give this feeble hitter more plate appearances than any other Diamondback? If you must play Womack, bat him 8th, for heaven’s sake.

If a team’s leadoff man contributes less offense than the average performer (i.e. below 100 OQ), the manager has a serious need to rethink his batting order. But managers still exist who have not learned this lesson.

The Braves didn’t show much sense when they signed Ken Caminiti after Texas discovered that he could no longer play. The Braves already had a third baseman (all-star Chipper Jones), so they stuck Caminiti at first, a position he’d never played. Predictably, he was a butcher out there, costing the team run after run, and his 92 OQ was a sorely inadequate offensive contribution. Atlanta finally got wise, benched Caminiti, and signed ageless Julio Franco for the stretch run. Franco held the fort with a 112 OQ.

Atlanta rookie Marcus Giles’ very creditable 105 OQ at second base may herald future stardom. He’s just 23.

Baseball’s nuttiest free agent signing had to be Derek Bell by Pittsburgh. The Pirates inked Bell to a multiyear, multimillion dollar deal and installed him in right field, even though John Vander Wal, the incumbent, out OQ-ed Bell by 44 points last year and is no worse a defensive player. Bell rewarded the Pirates with a 77 OQ, and after he got hurt, the team found itself better off with anybody and everybody they found on their bench. Then Bell was implicated in a child prostitution scandal in Florida!

Speaking of the Pirates, are they still making noises about converting catcher Jason Kendall to an outfielder? If they do, what they’ll have is the least productive regular outfielder in baseball. Not even an outfielding whiz like Richie Ashburn could hold onto regular status with an OQ of 83. If Kendall is any kind of a decent defensive catcher, they need to keep him behind the plate.

BARRY BONDS BONBONS

Barry Bonds’ 2001 season was the fourth best in the 126 years of major league baseball, trailing only Babe Ruth in 1920, Ruth in 1923, and Ted Williams in 1941. Bonds’ 1.8375 base-to-out ratio was second only to Ruth’s 1920 mark of 1.874.

In breaking Mark McGwire’s home run record, did Bonds have it tougher than McGwire did when he set the mark in 1998? Absolutely. Bonds’ team was battling for a postseason berth, while McGwire’s Cardinals were never a factor in the race. McGwire surpassed the old record on September 8, and everything he did thereafter was icing on the cake. Bonds had to chase the old record right down to the wire. And Bonds saw even fewer pitches in the strike zone than McGwire did.

Bonds actually broke two of McGwire’s major league records. The less-publicized record was for fewest singles in 150 or more games. Bonds hit just 49 singles this year. (McGwire hit 53 in 1991 during an inadequate 108 OQ season.)

Bonds’ season was all the more remarkable when you consider that he’s 37 and doesn’t get to DH. I’ve said before that Bonds’ career has been very comparable to that of Williams, another celebrated lefthanded hitter.

1. Both had self-absorbed, churlish personalities. They hated reporters and were hated by them in return. They were often resented by their teammates, and they were not beloved by the public.

2. Both played left field exclusively. Both were above-average defensive players. (Forget what you've heard about Williams' fielding. I often saw him play in 1959 and 1960, and even at age 40+ he was a very good left fielder.)

3. Both hit for average and for power. Both drew a lot of walks, because both believed in waiting for their pitch.

4. Both failed to perform well in big games. To be fair, in these games the opposition's entire game plan was to shut down the big man. Given nothing good to hit with so much at stake drove these guys crazy, and they began swinging at bad pitches rather than accepting bases on balls.

Like all the really great hitters of baseball history, Bonds has the discipline to be selective, to wait for the pitch he can hit. But it should also be noted that Bonds is the new spearhead of a revolution in batting style similar to the one Ruth wrought in the 1920s. Bonds never seems to “go with the pitch.” When he sees one he can drive, no matter if it’s high, low, inside, or outside, he swings from the heels with every ounce of his strength, knowing that if he connects he’ll muscle it out of the park.

Every major league player, big or small, wants to hit the ball hard. That’s been true since time immemorial. But today’s’ behemoths are so strong that they’re willing to sacrifice bat control for a pure power swat, relying on brute strength to propel the ball over the wall more frequently than ever before. These guys disdain singles, doubles, and triples.

Bonds is not the first to employ this approach. McGwire has been doing it this way for years, and other beefed-up sluggers and wannabes are copying. But Bonds has developed it and flourished with it to an unprecedented degree.

By the way, when was the last time you saw a major league player choke up on the bat in a non-bunting situation? It’s been many years for me. I remember when Nellie Fox, playing in another power era, the 1950s, made a good living by choking up and punching the ball through the infield. Fox was the American League MVP in 1959!

THE CONTINENTAL LEAGUE

Do you remember the old Continental League, that third major league that existed on paper for one year (July 1959- August 1960)? Branch Rickey was its president. They were supposed to begin play in April 1961, but the majors put them out of business by proceeding with expansion plans of their own. Had the CL survived, it would be celebrating its 40th anniversary now.

To refresh your memory, the 8 Continental League franchises were:

Atlanta

Buffalo

Dallas

Denver

Houston

Minneapolis

New York

Toronto

It is interesting that one of these cities, Buffalo, still doesn't have major league baseball, and it is never mentioned as a possible destination for the desperate-to-relocate Montreal Expos. This although the Bisons annually lead the minor leagues in attendance.

Buffalo's first, last, and only major league team was the National League franchise that existed there for 7 seasons (1879-1885). They were pretty good, too. Their best hitter was slugging first baseman Dan Brouthers, and their pitching ace was Jim Galvin. Both are in the Hall of Fame.

RUMINATIONS

* How come they didn’t have farewell tours a la Tony Gwynn and Cal Ripken for retiring veterans Eric Davis, Tony Fernandez, Stan Javier, Wally Joyner, John Jaha, and Harold Baines? They were all fine players in their day. Baines says he can still play, but I can’t imagine that anyone will be foolish enough to sign him after he posted a 27 OQ as White Sox DH. Just about any American League pitcher, if allowed to bat, could equal that. Heck, you or I could.

* Last year’s stars who weren’t for real: Darin Erstad, AL; Edgardo Alfonzo and Richard Hidalgo, NL (tie).

* My vote for Disaster of the Year goes to utility infielder Donnie Sadler. In the offseason Boston GM Dan Duquette was shrewd enough to unload Sadler to Cincinnati for the very serviceable Chris Stynes. The Reds found themselves stuck with a player who gave them a 68 OQ and 3 RBI in 84 at bats, and who drove Manager Bob Boonecrazy with his fielding and baserunning gaffes in the late innings of close games. There was a limit to even the Reds’ masochism, so they got rid of Sadler in midseason. But he managed to hook up with Kansas City, another organization not known for sound personnel decisions. Sadler hit .129 for the Royals, with 2 RBI in 101 at bats and an OQ of 40. If you can’t hit, can’t field, and can’t run the bases, what good are you?

* Know your Torrealbas: Steven Torrealba catches for Atlanta. Yorvit Torrealba catches for San Francisco. The latter, by the way, is the only Yorvit ever to play in the major leagues.

* When in Jena, stay at the Black Bear Hotel.

October 2001